# 1NC

## Off-Case

### 1NC

T: USFG

#### Affs should defend hypothetical implementation of antitrust law in alignment with the resolution.

#### “Resolved” requires law

WP 64, (Words and Phrases, 1964, Permanent Edition)

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### “USFG” means any of the three branches

US Code 88, 42 U.S. Code § 4914, “Development of low-noise-emission products,” <https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/4914>)

(2) The term “Federal Government” includes the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the Government of the United States, and the government of the District of Columbia.

#### “Core antitrust laws” are the Sherman, Clayon, and FTC Acts

Kimmel & Fanchiang 20, \*Senior Counsel at Crowell & Moring, LLP in Washington, D.C., twenty years of experience as an antitrust lawyer, Ph.D. in economics from the University of California at Berkeley \*\*associate in Crowell & Moring’s Irvine, CA office and a member of the firm’s antitrust and commercial litigation groups (Lisa Kimmel \*\*Eric Fanchiang, 2020, “Antitrust and Intellectual Property Licensing,” in 2020 Licensing Update, Wolters Kluwer Legal & Regulatory U.S., https://www.crowell.com/files/20200401-Licensing-Update-Chapter-13.pdf

U.S. antitrust law is defined by federal and state statutes, as interpreted by the courts. The core federal statutes are the Sherman Act,1 passed by Congress in 1890, and the Federal Trade Commission2 and Clayton Acts,3 both passed in 1914. The United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC” or “Commission”) (together the “agencies”) share enforcement of most areas of federal antitrust law but with some differences in the scope of their authority. The FTC has sole authority to enforce Section 5 of FTC Act, which prohibits (1) unfair methods of competition and (2) unfair or deceptive acts or practices. The FTC almost always pursues claims for anticompetitive conduct as unfair methods of competition and reserves charges of unfair or deceptive acts or practices for consumer protection violations. Though the FTC's authority to challenge unfair methods of competition goes beyond conduct prohibited by the Sherman and Clayton Acts, in practice the FTC brings most unfair methods of competition cases under the same standards that courts apply to Sherman Act claims. The most prominent exception is the invitation to collude offense, which falls outside the scope of the Sherman Act (if the invitation is not accepted, there is no agreement). The FTC challenges invitations to collude as so-called “standalone” violations of Section 5.4 The DOJ has sole authority to pursue criminal violations of the antitrust laws. Most states have their own state antitrust and unfair competition statutes. State law follows federal law to some extent, though as discussed below, may differ from federal law in meaningful ways that vary state to state. State attorneys general and private parties can also typically file suit to enforce both federal and state antitrust law.

#### Vote neg:

#### 1---fairness---a limited and predictable topic defines prep and research, while preventing the aff from skirting clash, moving to the fringes, and picking true arguments, which wrecks neg ground; this outweighs because debate’s a game---competition encourages research practices and innovation, which is a prerequisite to participation

#### 2---clash---open subjects cause monopolization of the moral high ground, which denies a role for the neg and prevents second level understanding and turns case

Grossberg 15, Morris Davis Distinguished Professor University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (Lawrence Grossberg, 2015, “We All Want to Change the World THE PARADOX OF THE U.S. LEFT A POLEMIC,” <http://www.lwbooks.co.uk/ebooks/we_all_want_to_change_the_world.pdf>)

I will, in the following description, focus on the situation in the human sciences (rather than the hard sciences), where the explosion of publication creates an ever-expanding circle in which there is always too much to read—too many positions, too many arguments, too much contradictory evidence—so that scholars have to rely on either the author's stature or theoretical and/or political agreement. It has become almost impossible to read everything one must read, everything necessary to legitimate, at least in traditional terms, the claim of academic expertise or scholarship. In fact, given this situation (and its consequences as I will describe below), the most surprising thing is how much good work continues to be produced. This situation has serious consequences: First, one's expertise becomes defined in increasingly narrow terms, resulting in the proliferation of sub-fields.9

[footnote 9 beings]

For example, one might point to security studies, surveillance studies, transition studies, game studies, code studies, hip-hop studies, horror studies, etc.

[footnote 9 ends]

And while each of them is valuable for their interdisciplinary efforts around a new empirical field, they all too often act as if the questions (and the realities they interrogate) are new; unfortunately, they rarely say anything new or surprising, anything that has not been said elsewhere. They frequently simply re-discover in their own empirical "pocket" universe what others have said previously in other fields. For example, all sorts of technologically defined sub-fields rediscover the rather old assumption that media audiences are active. This is partly because, within each subfield, one gets the impression of witnessing endless redistributions of a highly circumscribed set of citations and authors, under a series of ever-changing terms to describe their fields or positions. So, academics create ever shrinking circles in which authors cite a few theoretically and politically compatible works, and then follow the footnotes, all of which ultimately lead back to the original authors, creating an endlessly self-referential closed system of citations, a numbingly predictable, circular tissue of references. Second, one is less likely to read work that appears tangential but may nevertheless be absolutely decisive to produc[e]ing truly interesting and insightful research. Asking significant questions should demand that one makes reference to all sorts of concepts and questions which would lead one to follow other unexpected traditions and lines of research, since any investigation (e.g., around questions of participation, publics, or leadership, to use only a few examples that have irked me recently) is likely to open up to an entire history of problematization, of conversations and debates, but who can afford the time and energy anymore. Third, one tends to read only the most recent work since so much is being published—in various media—so rapidly that there is little time to go back and read. Fourth, one tends to select one's sources according to criteria that have more to do with theoretical and political sympathies than with an understanding of research as a conversation with difference. One reads selectively, finding those ideas that are already in line with what one assumes one already knows, and one establishes a body of near-sacred texts; fifth, one selects topics that are au courant, partly because there is less scaffolding that one has to build upon and partly because one's work is more likely to gain visibility and impact. Sixth, complexity goes out the door as one increasingly "sees the world in a grain of sand." One can no longer be satisfied claiming to have discovered merely a new piece of a complex puzzle or even an interesting redeployment of an older practice or structure, because such claims do not bring fame and glory—either to oneself or the university. Instead, one has to have discovered the leading edge, the new key or essence. One good but relatively small idea is expanded into a metonym for the entire economy, culture or society. Instead of seeking new discursive forms to embody complexity, uncertainty and humility, one goes with elegance, hyperbole and the ever receding new.

#### Policy debates over antitrust are valuable

Waller & Morse 20, \*John Paul Stevens Chair in Competition Law; Professor and Director, Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies, Loyola University Chicago School of Law \*\*J.D. Expected 2021, Loyola University Chicago School of Law (\*Spencer Weber Waller \*\*Jacob Morse, 7-26-2020, "The Political Face of Antitrust," Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial, and Commercial Law, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3660946)

IV. Antitrust in Civil Society

Competition issues are also part of the general civic discourse separate from the campaign rhetoric and legislative proposals offered by politicians. This is also a significant sign that antitrust has begun to be an important source of small “p” politics that engages substantial segments of the public at large. One example is the increased number of non-technical books intended for a lay audience that deal with the role of antitrust in a healthy economy and democracy. Recent and forthcoming books dealing with these themes include Tim Wu’s “The Curse of Bigness,”109 Matt Stoller’s “Goliath,”110 Maurice Stucke and Ariel Ezrachi’s “Competition Overdose,”111 Zephyr Teachout’s “Break ‘em Up,”112 and David Dayan’s “Monopolized.”113 On the academic side, there are a plethora of government and NGO studies of competition policy on digital competition114 and new works are flourishing which explore the broader ramifications of antitrust and competition in society.115 Long form and more mass-market journalism have also taken up the mantle of exploring the role of antitrust and competition policy. Such diverse magazines as The Atlantic,116 Time, 117 New Republic,118 American Prospect,119 Rolling Stone,120 New York Times magazine,121 Variety,122 National Review, 123 Foreign Policy,124 and other policy and opinion magazines have all run recent stories or profiles of individuals involved in antitrust issues. Before the COVID-19 pandemic effectively monopolized press coverage in the United States, there were thirty-three antitrust related stories on the front page of the New York Times or the front page of its business section over a three-month period in late 2019. 125 A majority of the stories focused on tech giants such as Apple, Microsoft, Google, Amazon, and Facebook.126 In addition, the New York Times also covered stories about mergers, merger policy, local issues such as the Chicago taxi market, and various smaller industries.127 This is separate from coverage during the same period of campaign issues and candidate statements relating to the field. A similar increase in coverage during this same period can be observed anecdotally in more business-oriented publications like Forbes, Barron’s, Wired, and the Wall Street Journal; general newspapers like USA Today, Washington Post, and Huffington Post; more local newspapers; as well as radio and television.128 Web pages and social media accounts on these issues have similarly proliferated on all ideological perspectives.129 Lobbying and public policy groups are growing in number and influence. Beyond the traditional trade associations and general think tanks there are now a number of active groups with antitrust as a large part of their focus. These include the Open Markets Institute, 130 American Antitrust Institute, 131 Anti-Monopoly Fund,132 Institute for Self-Reliance,133 Public Citizen,134 Public Knowledge,135 Demos, 136 and the International Center for Law and Economics.137 At the more technical legal end of the debate, antitrust is similarly flourishing as a field. One sees increased law school hiring in the field for the first time in decades. Academic institutes and centers abound with a wide variety of perspectives ranging from libertarian to enforcement oriented.138 Most major antitrust cases now feature multiple amicus briefs from legal and economic experts on both sides of an issue both in the Supreme Court or the Courts of Appeals.139 Conclusion Antitrust has always been political in nature. Antitrust law provides broad legal commands dealing with how governments and private individuals can challenge different types of market behavior. In this way, antitrust has not changed. Antitrust will never take the place of sports, the Dow Jones index, or the weather for conversation at the breakfast table, but it has become a meaningful part of the political and policy debate for candidates, the legislature, and important segments of civil society. What has changed, however, is the degree that antitrust has reentered the political arena. Once mostly the domain of technocrats, antitrust issues have been proposed and debated by Presidential candidates, political parties, legislators, pundits, journalists, lobby groups, and voters alike. There are also a flurry of serious proposals and investigations that would make significant changes to the current system if adopted. This is all to the good. Even if none of the current proposals come to fruition, the antitrust debate is part of a broader engagement with political economy issues dealing with fundamental concerns such as economic concentration, globalization, income inequality, social and racial justice, and even recently the proper response to the COVID-19 emergency. The many proposals, initiatives, and pressure groups represent at a minimum the return of antitrust as part of the progressive agenda.

## Case

### 1NC---Turn

#### Anti-capitalist movements are antiblack

Ervin 19, Lorenzo Kom'boa Ervin is an American writer, activist, and black anarchist, former member of the Black Panther Party and Concerned Citizens for Justice, The Progressive Plantation: racism inside white radical social change groups (Lorenzo Ervin, 9-11-2019, "The Left Has A Misogynoir Problem: Anti-Blackness At the Midwest Leftist Assembly," Afrofuturist Abolitionists of the Americas, https://afanarchists.wordpress.com/2019/09/11/the-left-has-a-misogynoir-problem-anti-blackness-at-the-midwest-leftist-assembly/?fbclid=IwAR1Mr2tlqWe265QQ2DFGff59MM\_ajYgKlItP6qgHb0p7Zx7WOfhmyT6O6BU)

From an Anarkata- I went to the Midwest Leftist Assembly to present a workshop with my homie —— on Black Anarchisms, and to connect with other Black radicals working in different parts of the region. I came with a lot of excitement and hope that folks would engage with us and the material. I wound up facing down an armed white leftist who was visibly agitated that attention had been brought to the rampant anti Blackness of security, organizers, and other participants by my friend, a Black woman, who had been profiled and targeted for harassment throughout the weekend. So when I tell you that the white left has a problem with racism, I’m telling you so that other Black, Brown & Indigenous folx are not put into dangerous situations just by being near you people. And when I say that we are not safe around you, I’m not being hyperbolic. This was one group of incredibly unprepared, non-trauma informed, white “leftists” who did not give an ounce of fuck about unpacking their anti-Blackness before urging Black folks to attend an event they bottom lined. But the screwed up thing is that many leftist orgs create and foster the same type of anti-Blackness that allow for the safety of Black participants – like those who attended the MLA with me last weekend – to constantly be put in sketchy situations. We are constantly placed in settings where we are demanded to interact in good faith and agree to empty, formless non apologies for incredibly racist words and (in)actions by white leftists – all the while being cast as “hostile”, “criminal”, and “threatening”, even as our access to platforms and ability to participate in organizing spaces are routinely stripped away through procedural death… The leftist bureaucratization that allows the same fuckin discrimination we experience everywhere else to happen in supposedly radical spaces. This is how the white left polices Black bodies while maintaining the optics of equitable, revolutionary praxis, simultaneously upholding white supremacy and the privileges it gives them. MLA was fucked up. But IWW? Y’all better take the warning now. From an anonymous Black Anarchist Long post about the Midwest Left Assembly I haven’t really been posting a lot of positive stuff about Midwest Left Assembly the past few days. It’s sad because this was an event that I had been promoting and supporting for the past months leading up to it. I’ve been a member of Horizontal Stateline since it began and helped set up the land trust prior to the even this year. Anyone can tell you my enthusiasm prior to the event. I invited a number of people from across the country including fellow black anarchists to facilitate a discussion about black anarchism with me. I drove and picked up black folks from around rockford, arranged travel, arranged housing so people could attend. I believed in this event. I’m saying all of this because I know how white leftists can come at people for attempting to “wreck” and I want to make it clear that my intentions were the best. However, despite the positive experiences of the first day (I’ll talk about in a later post), I’m writing this as a record for accountability. That’s because I had to leave early because one of my friends (a black woman) was repeatedly harassed by the security because they “mistook” her identity for someone else. That’s racial fucking profiling. We were stopped twice at the gate even though security should have known that my friend was not banned from the assembly. She had been promoting it with me in the upcoming months. It was traumatizing to my friend who was confronted again by security about not belonging at the event (something about her driving a car around the land trust even though she drove to the trust with me both days) while myself and another homie were about to play a show. She grabbed the mic and began to address the assembly about what happened. Many white folks weren’t taking what she was saying seriously and had to be silenced by other black attendees. (this isn’t just coming from me and her by the way, there were a number of other black folks who saw this happen and left as a result) From what I understand, none of the organizers or security team has even offered her an apology. I wish they had taken her and my concerns more seriously. Furthermore, the event organizers should not have treated my friend like a situation to be handled. The only situation that should have been handled was the chauvinistic behavior of the security team. ———— should not have been the person yelling at the white folks after that happened, that should have been the organizers. White people need to keep other white people in line. I sincerely regret bringing her and inviting other black people into the space (despite all of the good connections that I made). Activist spaces are meant to be safe and they need to be safe for everyone, especially black women and black queer folks. I understand the need for security at events like this but the security apparatus must be horizontal and needs to be grounded in anti-oppressive politics. (repeatedly stopping a black woman is not a good look when ya’ll radical white folks claiming to be somehow different from these killer cops). I don’t know what accountability looks like at this point but I know it has to involve formal apologies from the security team, the organizers and I believe some sort of financial compensation for my friend to support her organizing work (been telling yall to pay reparations). Frankly, what is even more fucked up is that my identity as a fair skinned college educated biracial man makes yall take this more seriously while if she had posted this, ya’ll wouldn’t have given a flying fuck. Once again, the misogynoir in this situation is palpable. We can’t claim to support black women and femmes in our rhetoric while not doing it in our actions. Star is not a troublemaker, she is not lying about this to start drama, if yall even attempt to insinuate that bullshit, I am going to block you. She and I had been repeatedly talking over the past few months about how to bring black people out to the event and how to support it as a whole. Passing this repeated harassment off as a misunderstanding and not taking it seriously is deeply anti-black and racist. As the black anarchist Lorenzo Kom’boa Ervin says “I give white radicals the tools to work with, a theoretical framework, and some analysis of racial oppression. I cannot, however, make them take the steps to actually use in dismantling racism inside radical movements. I just tell them that their lip service and feeble attempts to this point are unacceptable, and one day it will all be taken out of their hands. So they had better act now, or they will find themselves on the wrong side, when these decisive battles take place.” If you want to speak more to me about what happened in length, engage in some sort accountability, please send me a private message. More importantly, please apologize to the black women and femmes that were harmed. Also, please don’t bother them needlessly, they are both very busy people with lots of important work to do. I don’t believe in callout culture but I can’t see explicit anti-blackness exist in so-called radical spaces and not call it out. It is completely unacceptable that my friend felt like she didn’t belong in that space which lead to her, myself and others to leave early. I’m not really going to be engaging with white comments (I’m actually going to delete them) on this post but if you’re black, feel free to comment and ask any questions. White people should go read the progressive plantation right now. Our spaces must be informed by a committed intersectional politic. I hope white organizers take this lesson to grow and confront white supremacy within their own spaces. “These people want to demand ideological conformity, to make those incoming people of color toe the line. I believe they are threatened by the idea of possibly large numbers of people of color joining the Anarchist movement and especially by the idea they might create autonomous tendencies that would challenge white hegemony of the overall movement. Predictably, there will those among them who will rise up in mock alarm at the very notion… “how dare you say this?” “See there, he’s making trouble again!” But I have seen it happen numerous times over the years and am frankly sick of it. There is no use pretending there is no racism in the Anarchist scene, or trying to discredit me for raising the issue. I have both seen and experienced it myself.”

#### Performative Link---every time their ev mentions black folk OR people of color, they intentionally omitted highlighting---inserting this to prove the awkward cross-ex moment

1AC Ervin et al. 19 JoNina Abron-Ervin is a journalist, retired educator, and a former member of the Detroit chapter of the Black Panther Party. As a writer, teacher and organizer, she has helped organize numerous efforts over the course of decades, including the anti- apartheid movement and campaigns against police terror. She is the author of the book Driven by Movement: Activists of the Black Power Era. Lorenzo Kom’boa Ervin is an anarchist writer, organizer, and former political prisoner who came up through SNCC and the Black Panther Party in the 1960s. Among other works, he is the author of the book Anarchism and the Black Revolu- tion, which introduces the principles of class struggle anarchism and discusses its relevance to the Black liberation struggle. “Black Antifascism: A Conversation”, in in Propter Nos Vol 3 (2019) ipartman

L: Well, in actual fact, people are organizing now. It’s not like they’re not. Even though I have some differences of opinion with Black Lives Matters type groups, the fact that they came into existence and have been organizing during this period is important. But they need to take it to another level. We’re saying that organizers and activists have to rethink tactically, and understand that community-based organizing where they politically educate the people in their communities is the key. We’re telling people who are already doing this work to take a different approach, and think about this system in terms of being fascism. Take police killings for instance. Police killings are in fact fascism. Especially when they are systematic police killings, where we’ve had essentially hundreds of thousands over the last few decades. We’ve had hundreds of thousands of people killed. And more killed by the United States in military conflict abroad. So we need to understand this as being a question of confronting the State. This rethinking is about that. We’re asking organizers to begin to rethink. To understand that it is time to build a broader level of organization. Not just in the streets or a one-off protest. But to reach people on the everyday level and train them, so that they can then go and tell other people, and build organizations on a local level. It may just be block by block. We don’t know. We’ve seen these things happen in the past. But they haven’t been seen in this period. Therefore, we have to adopt new tactics. That’s one of the things I would say. Another thing is to bring together these movements, these different forces. Bring together the movement against police terrorism with the movement against mass imprisonment. Bring together all kinds of forces, including whatever is happening in particular communities. These fronts will differ from region to region, city to city, but whatever those contradictions are, whatever they’re organizing around—you even got some churches that could be used! You got radical preachers, or whatever. I think that’s important to emphasize: the idea of community-based organizing is to reach masses of people, who you can educate and bring into the struggle. If you got in your whole movement 5,000 people, well then the objective is to bring in 50,000. And have those numbers and go out in the community and politically educate them. So that’s what we need to do. We need to escalate our level of organizing and under- standing as well. And we need to learn from past movements like the Black Panther Party. They practiced and created a whole movement of Black anti-fascism—or black- led anti-fascism. The actual conditions and the poverty of the masses of people requires us to organize a movement for food and housing, movements against imprisonment, and within the communities where so many go into prison create programs to reunite them, to offer transportation, and so forth. These are the kinds of programs we need to think about in this period. But on a broader scale. I even think we need to think about a poor people’s survival movement. Or a “survival economy,” if you want to call it that. This is something comrade George Jackson talks about in Blood in My Eye (1971). He talked about building these kinds of environments within a city that could feed people, and politically educate people, etc. He was of course basing this on the history of the Black Panther Party, and he saw it as a longer-term kind of thing. The creation of a resistance economy and a resistance movement that wasn’t just armed self-defense, but about feeding people, housing, clothing you know. Those things that keep people going, as well as their own organizers. J: And one of the things that really has to be done, especially right now, is we have to fight against this whole notion that we can use electoral politics. If we are going to build revolutionary organizers, create the conditions for revolutionary community organizing, we’re going to have to reject this whole notion. And that’s gonna be a big battle. L: That’s right. J: A lot of people are gonna be saying “you have to vote.” Well, you don’t have to vote if the people who are running for office are not going to change the conditions in your community. Why do you have to vote for them? You do not have to vote for them. You could get your community to have its own community elections, where you choose people within your own community outside of the Democratic or Republican Party to be accountable to the people, to deal with the issues in your community. I see this as being a really key thing. There is too much focus on electoral politics right now. Until we get past it we’re not going to be successful. L: We need to create alternatives. We need to create people’s assemblies that are independent and autonomous of all this garbage. And by doing this we can reach people and educate, organize, and put them in opposition to the government, the State. We should be fighting for dual power. We need to build a mass movement to free political prisoners, end mass imprisonment, especially among communities of color. We need to combat State violence from police and vigilantes, fight austerity and poverty imposed by the government. We need to defeat fascists in the streets and in the government and corporate suites. Start survival campaigns that begin to build a new economy to soften the blow of the collapse of this system, which is coming. We also need to build a black partisan/worker’s militia. I’m not saying it will be done tomorrow or it should be done tomorrow, but we need to be doing these things if we are gonna go from op- pression to liberation. I guess the main thing we can say is that we have to build an ant- fascist movement that is a movement fighting for revolution—for social revolution. If it’s not ready to do that then it is just a defensive organization, which will be defeated in due time.

### 1NC---AT: Blakely

### 1NC---Turn

#### Antitrust is good---two impacts:

#### 1---Health consolidation spikes health care costs and drastically lowers quality of care---antitrust is reverse causal

Numerof 20, PhD @ Bryn Mawr, internationally recognized consultant and author with over 25 years of experience in the field of strategy development and execution, business model design, and market analysis (Rita, “Covid-Induced Hospital Consolidation: What Are The Impacts On Consumers, And Potentially The President,” *Forbes*, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/ritanumerof/2020/11/11/covid-induced-hospital-consolidation-what-are-the-impacts-on-consumers-and-potentially-the-president/?sh=692d6fc94da0>)

Covid-19 has initiated yet another wave: A wave of hospital mergers and acquisitions that will have devastating consequences for public health if industry doesn’t soon execute an about-face. Whether because they’re on the brink of bankruptcy and have subscribed to the half-truth that size is protective, or because they think they can score some good deals and believe scale and success are synonymous, the financial fallout of Covid-19 has caused many hospital executives to make consolidation a core part of their future plans. With the intent of increasing care quality and decreasing consumer costs despite these challenging times, the merger between Shannon Medical Center and Community Hospital and partnership between Intermountain and Sanford Health are just two examples. There are multiple reasons why consumers absolutely cannot afford for industry to bulk up in an effort to weather this storm. The first is that the positive efforts executives claim consolidation will help them accomplish often prove to be futile. Research shows that wherever market concentration is high, there are also higher prices for both consumers and the employers who provide their healthcare coverage. In the absence of competition, costs increase and quality deteriorates. That’s the opposite of progress. Second, generally speaking, the union of two institutions with operational shortcomings only creates one larger institution with even more operational shortcomings! That’s not progress either. Third, Covid-induced consolidation will only make future progress many times more difficult. The larger an organization is, the more it will struggle to rapidly adapt to healthcare disruptions like we’re seeing today. Retail giants like Walmart, Walgreens, Amazon and CVS are pivoting to cater to healthcare consumer demands for affordability and accessibility. Right now, they’re still a blip on the radar relative to mainstream healthcare delivery, but they are looking to eventually corner the market and drive the industry forward. And as they continue down this path, consolidated healthcare systems will be left behind, potentially at the expense of the consumers in that area. The potential impact of continued consolidation on rural patients is especially concerning. Rural communities may have a limited number of the big-box retailers mentioned above. And the unfortunate fact of the matter is that when a larger hospital or health system purchases a smaller, rural hospital, it’s usually only a matter of time before the purchasing system realizes that unless they drastically pare down and reconfigure operations, the acquired hospital will never be profitable. Many eventually decide to close up shop, in some instances reducing or even eliminating rural patients’ options for care delivery. In the absolute worst-case scenario, this is exactly the reality all consumers could face if consolidation continues at its current pace. In theory and if left unchecked, all of the hospitals in the United States could be owned by only a handful of mammoth systems that then lack incentive to continually deliver quality services at lower total cost of care.

#### Health care antitrust is a premier vehicle for social change and solves the disproportionate racial impact of rising health costs.

Kritter 21, University of California, Berkeley, School of Law, (Dani, March 2021, “Antitrust as Antiracist”, <https://www.californialawreview.org/antitrust-as-antiracist/>)

The [federal antitrust laws](https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws)—three statutes enacted over a century ago—are in the spotlight. The year 2020 brought a [new reckoning with corporate power](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/dec/18/google-facebook-antitrust-lawsuits-big-tech) and a [resurgent interest in using antitrust law](https://newrepublic.com/article/160646/biden-antitrust-blueprint-monopoly-busting) as a force for populist change. The “hipster antitrust” movement argues that the focus of antitrust policy should not be limited to market power and consumer welfare. Rather, antitrust can and should be a remedy for a suite of societal ills, from workers’ rights to campaign finance and income inequality. The year 2020 also marked an awakening to [racial injustice](https://news.berkeley.edu/2020/09/22/racial-justice-in-america-a-deeper-look/) in America. The deaths of George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, and Ahmaud Arbery sparked nationwide outrage and demands to reform institutions built on systemic racism. Yet the recent plans for [antitrust reform](https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/117th-congress-takes-early-steps-6904745/)—which primarily focus on monopolies in tech—ignore the fact that the antitrust status quo perpetuates [racial injustice](https://theappeal.org/how-antitrust-perpetuates-structural-racism/). But it doesn’t have to be this way. This blog identifies consolidation in healthcare and vertical restraints in franchising as two examples of how lax antitrust enforcement has disproportionately harmed people of color. It also argues that by dusting off existing antitrust tools, antitrust enforcement can be [antiracist](https://nmaahc.si.edu/learn/talking-about-race/topics/being-antiracist). Background: The Antitrust Toolbox Congress enacted the federal antitrust laws to check the power of massive corporations run amuck. These laws—the Sherman Act, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act, and the Clayton Act—were originally designed to control corporate power, protect individual economic freedom, and ensure a fair and equal society. But beginning in the 1970s when Robert Bork published the still-influential “[Antitrust Paradox](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2012/12/20/antitrust-was-defined-by-robert-bork-i-cannot-overstate-his-influence/),” courts slowly narrowed the focus of antitrust law to protecting consumer welfare. Today, antitrust enforcement prioritizes preventing the anticompetitive acquisition, exercise, or maintenance of market power that threatens consumer welfare and competition—a much narrower goal than its populist origins. Dusting Off the Tools Recent years have seen [bipartisan](https://www.axios.com/exclusive-poll-shows-bipartisan-support-for-tech-antitrust-action-c3794ff5-120d-44d8-bac1-58b033efbd8a.html) interest in reining in powerful corporations with more aggressive antitrust enforcement. One of the few agency voices calling for an antiracist approach to antitrust is Rebecca Slaughter, the acting chair of the FTC. Slaughter [has recently spoken out](https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1583714/slaughter_remarks_at_gcr_interactive_women_in_antitrust.pdf) about using antitrust enforcement to “right the wrongs of systemic racism.” She challenges what she views to be a faulty premise of antitrust law: “that antitrust can and should be value-neutral, and therefore social justice problems like racism do not have a role in antitrust enforcement.” Slaughter argues that antitrust has never been and never will be value-neutral. Antitrust addresses market structures, and racism is entrenched in the historic and current market structures in the United States. When agencies make decisions about how to deploy antitrust tools, they can choose whether to reinforce these structural inequities or to dismantle them. Healthcare and franchising are two examples of how a shift in antitrust enforcement from “value-neutral” to antiracist can break down market structures that perpetuate racial injustice. Honing in on Healthcare Monopolies Consolidation in the healthcare industry is a driving force behind the sky-high cost of medical care and pharmaceutical drugs. Due to a wave of healthcare mergers, most hospital markets in the United States are dominated by a single corporate entity. The lack of competition means the dominant hospital is free to exercise market power by raising prices and restricting output. [Recent studies](https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/18/health/covid-hospitals-medicare-rates.html) of prices for hospital and outpatient treatment report that healthcare mergers have resulted in large networks charging private insurers 2.5 to 3 times more than Medicare rates for the same patient care. These rising costs lead to higher insurance premiums paid by employers and individuals. Artificially inflated healthcare costs disproportionately burden people of color and create a barrier to accessing quality care. Black families spend a greater share of their household income on health care premiums and out-of-pocket costs than the average American family. And of the thirty million [uninsured](https://www.brookings.edu/blog/usc-brookings-schaeffer-on-health-policy/2020/02/19/there-are-clear-race-based-inequalities-in-health-insurance-and-health-outcomes/) individuals in the United States, half are people of color. The [COVID-19 pandemic](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/health-equity/racial-ethnic-disparities/index.html) has put this health inequity in sharp focus: racial and ethnic minority groups are more likely to contract the virus, get severely ill, and die from coronavirus infections. What can antitrust do? First, antitrust merger review can be antiracist. Mergers between competitors are scrutinized under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, which prohibits mergers that may substantially lessen competition or create a monopoly. When determining whether a merger lessens competition, the FTC, Department of Justice (DOJ), and courts consider the likelihood of anticompetitive effects. An antiracist application of the Clayton Act would consider racially disparate outcomes like health care costs, insurance premiums, and the quality of care provided as anticompetitive effects. Business practices that perpetuate systemic racism are anticompetitive because they exclude people of color from full participation in the market. And this exclusion is expensive: a study by Citigroup estimates that discrimination cost the U.S. economy [$16 trillion](https://www.npr.org/sections/live-updates-protests-for-racial-justice/2020/09/23/916022472/cost-of-racism-u-s-economy-lost-16-trillion-because-of-discrimination-bank-says) since 2000. Moreover, there is precedent for applying a broad conception of anticompetitive effects in merger review. In [Brown Shoe Co. Inc. v. United States](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/20/technology/tech-giants-antitrust-law.html), the Supreme Court held that a meager 7.2 percent combined market share of two merging shoe manufacturers was unhealthy market concentration under the Clayton Act. Chief Justice Earl Warren acknowledged that concentration in the shoe industry might offer some efficiencies and lower prices for consumers, but “the protection of viable, small, locally owned businesses” was a priority. Therefore, agencies can and should argue that mergers that reinforce racial inequity substantially lessen competition. Second, antitrust enforcement actions can hone in on industries like healthcare where the anticompetitive effects are acutely felt by people of color. As California attorney general from 2011 to 2017, [Vice President Kamala Harris](https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/06/health/kamala-harris-health-care.html) prioritized taking on healthcare prices through antitrust. Her investigation laid the groundwork for California’s suit against [Sutter Health](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/03/health/sutter-hospitals-medical-bills.html) for using its market power to raise prices and extort better deals from insurers, which resulted in a $575 million settlement. The DOJ and FTC should follow in California and Vice President Harris’s footsteps and crack down on healthcare, utilizing an antiracist approach.

#### 2--- The disappearance of antitrust law from public discourse has cemented corporate power.

David Dayen 15, author of *Monopolized: Life in the Age of Corporate Power (2020)* and *Chain of Title: How Three Ordinary Americans Uncovered Wall Street's Great Foreclosure Fraud*, “Bring Back Antitrust,” The American Prospect, Vol. 26, No. 4, Fall 2015, lexis.

In 1964, historian Richard Hofstadter gave a speech at the University of California, Berkeley, titled "What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?" He wondered why anti-monopoly sentiment ceased to become the subject of public agitation. "Once the United States had an antitrust movement without antitrust prosecutions," Hofstadter said. "In our time, there have been antitrust prosecutions without an antitrust movement."

Now we have lost both the movement and the prosecutions. When we talk about banks that are too big to fail, we're talking about antitrust. When we talk about the high cost of health care, we're talking about antitrust. So many of our key domestic issues are fundamentally questions about whether we should tolerate monopolies, or dismantle them. But this formulation-a centerpiece of public debate in the last robberbaron era between the 1880s and 1910s-has all but disappeared from popular discourse.

Can anti-monopoly sentiment be revived? When New York's Working Families Party first recruited Zephyr Teachout to run for governor, she said she would only do it if she could talk about monopolies. "They polled it, and they were correct that nobody knew what I was talking about," Teachout says. But when she eventually ran an insurgent campaign against incumbent Andrew Cuomo, she was determined to talk about it anyway.

"The minute you got past the sound-bite level, people responded to the concentration of power," Teachout says. They did campaign events at places where people paid their cable bills, using the pending Comcast-Time Warner merger, eventually abandoned, as the hook. She engaged farmers in upstate New York about monopsony power, and discussed Amazon and big banks on the stump. And it resonated. After only one month of campaigning, Teachout won 35 percent of the vote, with particular strength in upstate counties where farming issues were prominent.

"The Tea Party talks to people and says, 'You're out of power because government is taking it away from you,"' Teachout says. "Far too often, Democrats say, 'You're wrong, you're not out of power.' That's dissonant with our lived experience. You're out of power ... because your priorities don't matter and JPMorgan's do."

Beyond Teachout, you can see through the haze the stirrings of a grassroots antitrust agenda. The greatest anti-monopoly victory of the modern age, the Federal Communications Commission's net-neutrality rules, owed much to a smart, tech-savvy movement that leveraged big protest platforms. Web-native activists fought for the decentralized power of the Internet, without gatekeepers collecting tolls along the way. And they made the connection to things like the Comcast-Time Warner merger, which failed amid public outcry.

"After this existential threat to the Web, you see the same groups becoming interested in the deep history of anti-monopoly laws," Teachout says. "It's kind of an exciting intellectual moment, a fusion between old-school farmers who have been complaining for 30 years and new net-neutrality dreamers."

Monopolists have long used technological advances to consolidate power, from Gilded Age tycoons leveraging control of railroads and telegraphs to Amazon using its first-mover status in e-commerce to squeeze book producers, or Google harvesting traffic to their market-leading search engine to serve ads. It's easy to translate the need for a neutral platform for websites into the same need for book sales or car ride-sharing.

The European Union, in fact, did file formal antitrust charges against Google, accusing it of forcing search engine users into its own shopping platforms, and bundling Android phones with their own apps, to prevent competitors from performing the same functions. The FTC shut down its own investigation into Google over the same concerns in 2013. But an inadvertent disclosure revealed that the agency's Bureau of Competition recommended bringing a lawsuit, arguing that Google's conduct "has resulted-and will result-in real harm to consumers and to innovation in the online search and advertising markets." The political leadership ignored the recommendation.

The next administration must show "leadership that has a certain intellectual curiosity," says Maurice Stucke, pointing to the Google case as a missed opportunity. An alteration in posture would make enforcement far more vigorous, and bringing more cases will give litigators more experience and confidence to negotiate the judicial barriers. The American Antitrust Institute plans to create a transition document for the incoming administration, as they did for the Obama transition.

But at a time of political disempowerment, teaching about the dangers of monopolies and how we have the laws on the books to fight them, and creating upward pressure to do it, offers great potential for a paradigm shift. Connecting Senator Elizabeth Warren's fight against a rigged financial system and Al Franken's fight against media concentration can spark broader political energy.

You could see this potential in Washington, D.C., where in August, the city's Public Service Commission rejected a merger between energy firms Exelon and Pepco, citing "more active participation by parties and interested persons than any other proceeding in the Commission's more than a century of operations." Activists argued a giant Exelon conglomerate would fail to devote resources to the city's clean-energy goals, connecting anti-monopolization with fighting climate change.

There are a lot of reasons for runaway monopolies: an intellectual hijacking by Chicago-school conservative economists, the over-financialization of the economy, a failure of federal antitrust enforcement. But perhaps the biggest reason is that antitrust policy has become divorced from politics, confined to specialized lawyers and mathematicians instead of citizens and activists. Without grassroots momentum, politicians and enforcement agencies can safely ignore the issue. That's the challenge for a small band of academics, think-tank fellows, and activists: to make monopolies a vital issue again, connecting with the severe economic anxiety Americans feel.

### 1NC---Turn

#### COVID-19 proves capitalism is financially sustainable---no structural collapse.

Carlsson-Szlezak 20, \*[Philipp Carlsson-Szlezak](https://hbr.org/search?term=philipp%20carlsson-szlezak&search_type=search-all) is a partner and managing director in BCG’s New York office and global chief economist of BCG; \*[Martin Reeves](https://hbr.org/search?term=martin%20reeves&search_type=search-all) is the chairman of Boston Consulting Group’s BCG Henderson Institute in San Francisco and a coauthor of [The Imagination Machine](https://www.amazon.com/Imagination-Machine-Create-Companys-Future/dp/1647820863/ref=sr_1_1?keywords=Martin+Reeves%2C+The+Imagination+Machine&qid=1596553141&s=books&sr=1-1) (Harvard Business Review Press, 2021); \*[Paul Swartz](https://hbr.org/search?term=paul%20swartz&search_type=search-all) is a director and senior economist in the BCG Henderson Institute, based in BCG’s New York office; (“The U.S. Is Not Headed Toward a New Great Depression”, https://hbr.org/2020/05/the-u-s-is-not-headed-toward-a-new-great-depression)

Why the U.S. Is Unlikely to be Headed Towards a Structural Regime Break

Though the path from the crisis we’re in now to either depression or debt crisis is not impossible, it’s not easy or natural, if we examine each of the four paths in regards to the current situation:

Policy Error — The policy challenge of coronavirus is enormous, but what is on display is the opposite of the inaction of the Great Depression. On the monetary side, the first signs of stress in the banking system — in the repo and commercial paper markets — were met with timely and sizable monetary policy action. On the fiscal side, it didn’t take long — certainly by Washington standards — to pass the $2 trillion CARES Act to provide funds to counteract the wave of liquidity and capital problems for the real economy (households and firms). Beyond any specific policy action, we are seeing a mindset in which policy makers will keep throwing policy innovations at the problem until something sticks — quite the opposite of the 1930s.

Political Willingness — It certainly is possible that political calculus gets in the way of averting a structural breakdown, but not very plausible because the political costs are high. To be sure there are two risks involved: 1) The unwillingness to craft a piece of legislation, perhaps because of differences in analysis, beliefs, or dogma; and 2) the failure to pass legislation because one side sees greater political gain in obstruction. While the TARP fiasco reminds us that both risks are real and shouldn’t be dismissed, crises tend to lubricate deal making, and the costs of political obstruction are particularly high, even in a hyper-partisan election year.

Policy Dependence — This path is not applicable in the U.S. because of monetary sovereignty. The Federal Reserve will always facilitate fiscal policy in a time of low and stable inflation and a healthy currency.

Policy Rejection — A debt crisis seems improbable for the U.S.: Inflation expectations are very well anchored (and, if anything, too low). The rate-risk correlation is very solid, where in risk-off periods (moment when investors are less tolerant of risk and prices of risk assets like stocks fall) bond prices rally (yields fall). The USD reserve currency status is deeply entrenched as the rest of the world needs to hold U.S. safe assets (and don’t wish to see their currencies appreciate). And nominal interest rates are generally lower than nominal growth (r – g < 0). All of these factors make for favorable financing conditions. Can coronavirus damage all that and deliver a crisis where markets refuse to purchase U.S. debt? It’s possible, but very implausible, and it would be a long and painful process. A break in the inflation regime plays out over several years.

#### Their sustainability evidence is too old and about Trumpism which Biden shows the status quo is resilient to

#### Transition is impossible.

Büchs & Koch 18. \* Associate Professor in Sustainability, Economics and Low Carbon Transitions at the Sustainability Research Institute, University of Leeds. For CREDS, she is working on the Excess Travel team, modelling high travel demand and identifying interventions for high travel demand reduction. \*\* Professor at Lund University. Visiting Scholar / Guest Professor at Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Glasgow University, Programa de Economía del Trabajo (Santiago de Chile), Lund University (prior to my current employment), GESIS - Leibniz Institute of the Social Sciences in Cologne, University of Edinburgh and at the Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies in Potsdam. (September 20th, 2018, “Challenges for the degrowth transition: The debate about wellbeing.” <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2018.09.002>)

‘Locked’ into growth and rising wellbeing expectations? Having set out in the previous sections the discussion about wellbeing in the degrowth discourse so far, we now examine two additional wellbeing related challenges to the political feasibility of degrowth. First, it can be argued that the dominance of growth-based economics has taken on a ‘structural’ quality in current societies. This means that a transition to degrowth that can successfully support wellbeing would need to involve very fundamental social, economic, political, cultural and technological changes – some of which are difficult to achieve through political means. Second, these changes would ideally need to happen very fast, to present a meaningful response to the climate change crisis. We argue here that the process of transition itself is likely to bring about challenges for achieving aspired wellbeing outcomes. Third, and based on the argument that the framework of universal basic needs is most appropriate for discussing wellbeing in a degrowth context, we raise the question how well (or not) applying this framework to think about wellbeing aligns with current societies’ wellbeing expectations. 3.1. Growth ‘lock in’ Economic growth, as an attribute of market capitalism, has structural properties – it is needed to stabilise modern societies as it provides employment, public sector provision through tax revenues, rising wages, and hence social stability ([Petridis et al., 2015: 178](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715" \l "bib0375), [Rosa et al., 2017](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715" \l "bib0405)). Economic growth is organised around and shapes a range of tightly coupled structures, including institutions, norms, discourses, culture, technologies, competences, identities, etc. Historically speaking, growth is a fairly recent phenomenon which only picked up in the 19th century together with the industrialisation of Western economies. In a co-evolutionary process, a range of institutions developed which are now coupled to a growth-based capitalist economy, including the nation state, representative democracy, the rule of law and current legal, financial, labour market, education, research, and welfare systems. These are based on philosophies which emerged to justify and give meaning to these institutions, for instance on individualism, freedom, justice, sovereignty, or power. The embeddedness of the growth-based capitalistic economic system in these co-evolved institutions and ways of thinking makes it difficult to transition to a degrowth system because the change of the economic system would need to involve a parallel transformation of those coupled systems. In Luhmann’s words, the constitution of the current system “defuturises” ([Luhmann, 1976: 141](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715" \l "bib0305)) the future, it reduces the “openness” of the future; “path dependency” or even “lock-in” are related expressions that capture this idea. Two examples which directly link to people’s wellbeing can illustrate this point: the relationship between welfare states and growth, and between growth and people’s mind-sets and identities. The satisfaction of needs is influenced by the character of socio-economic institutions, including the ways in which work, welfare, retirement, health, education and family life are governed; as well as by the structure of the distribution of a range of resources that support health and wellbeing. Welfare state institutions play an important role in these areas in high income economies, and they are closely coupled with economic growth ([Bailey, 2015](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715" \l "bib0015)). Rising economic prosperity in the post Second World War period provided the resources for establishing welfare states in Europe and elsewhere, and the funding of current welfare state institutions is closely coupled to economic growth as it largely depends on income-related taxes and [social security contributions](https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/social-sciences/social-security-contributions). The positive relationship between economic growth and welfare states in many ways also works the other way round: welfare states support growth by enhancing the population’s health and education levels, providing unemployment and minimum income benefits for people out of work. This helps to increase productivity, maintain consumer demand, and more generally contain and minimise social conflict through redistribution and institutionalised conflict resolution between employers and employees. Evidently, a fundamental [reorganisation](https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/social-sciences/reorganization) of the economic and welfare system would be required under degrowth to sustain investments in health, education, and the reduction of poverty and [inequality](https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/social-sciences/inequality). This will be crucial in a context of decreasing material and financial resources, because if left unmanaged, this could provide fertile ground for new social conflicts with potentially detrimental implications for wellbeing. Various degrowth authors have made suggestions for alternative welfare institutions and policies, including working time reduction and redistribution as mentioned above ([Victor & Rosenbluth, 2007](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715" \l "bib0460)), a basic income ([Gorz, 1980](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715" \l "bib0190); [Dietz & O’Neill, 2013: 94](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715#bib0110)), and, from a Marxian perspective, the establishment of a cooperative economy in which businesses will be worker-owned and managed ([Blauwhof, 2012](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715" \l "bib0020)). These are all relevant suggestions, however, it should not be underestimated how radical the changes to existing social systems are that these new institutions represent. They challenge deeply entrenched ways of thinking about rights, justice, freedom, private property, individual responsibility, etc. A change of these deeply rooted ‘logics’ on which these institutions are based is not impossible, but very difficult to steer with political means. This point closely links to the idea that economic growth is not only at the core of various socio-economic institutions but is also very deeply anchored in people’s minds, bodies and identities which is likely to make the transition to degrowth additionally challenging. The concept of social practices helps us understand the ways in which agents (and their mind-sets and bodies) and broader social structures are continuously implicated and reproduced in the performance of social life ([Büchs & Koch, 2017: ch. 6](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715" \l "bib0060)). From this perspective, economic growth is not just an external premise that actors can decide to act upon or not, but it is a principle with structural properties that is engrained in ways of thinking and acting – for the most part habitually. Growth thus becomes something that is perceived as ‘natural’ by the vast majority of actors. A range of scholars have argued that the growth paradigm is deeply embedded in people’s minds and bodies ([Göpel, 2016](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715" \l "bib0185); [Lane, 1991](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715" \l "bib0285); [Welzer, 2011](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715" \l "bib0475); [Büchs & Koch, 2017: ch. 6](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715#bib0060)). This implies that people’s identities and life goals are closely aligned with the idea of growth – shaped by ideas of social progress, personal status and success through careers, rising income and consumption. Even seemingly alternative goals such as ‘personal fulfilment’ can be infused with ideas that remain tied to the growth paradigm, for instance if fulfilment is sought through high consumption and high emissions practices such as extensive long haul travel or expensive hobbies and gadgets. As [Meadows (1999)](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715" \l "bib0325) has pointed out, the most effective, but also the most difficult step in system transformation is the shift of paradigms that underpin the system. Again, since this is difficult to influence politically, it presents a major hurdle for a departure from growth-based systems that also maintains wellbeing.

#### Antitrust is key to sustainability.

Rebecca M. Henderson 20, Harvard’s John and Natty McArthur University Professor, based at Harvard Business School, and a research fellow at the National Bureau of Economic Research, “Reimagining Capitalism in the Shadow of the Pandemic,” Harvard Business Review, 7/28/2020, https://hbr.org/2020/07/reimagining-capitalism-in-the-shadow-of-the-pandemic, kyujin

The Pandemic’s Challenges — and Opportunities Capitalism is one of the great inventions of the human race — an unparalleled source of prosperity, opportunity and innovation. We won’t solve the problems that we face without it. To solve inequality, we need good jobs — and lots of them. To solve climate change, we need (among other things) to transform the world’s energy, transportation, and agricultural systems. Only the relentless pressure of the free market can drive this kind of transformative innovation at scale. In this context, the pandemic is both a massive challenge and an opportunity. A challenge because more than a half a million people have died, the global economy has been massively disrupted, and tens of millions of people have lost their jobs. A challenge because the combination of deep economic disadvantage — at the beginning of May nearly 61% percent of Hispanic and 44% of Black households had experienced a job or wage loss due to the corona virus, for example, compared with 38% percent of whites — and the killings of George Floyd, Ahmaud Arbery, Breona Taylor and countless others have brought anger and calls for justice to our streets. The world will almost certainly be poorer, more divided, and more fearful in 2021 than it was in 2019. It’s an opportunity because it has also shown us so vividly what is wrong. Inequality is no longer simply an abstract idea. It’s a reality that many “essential” workers must show up even when they’re sick because they have no savings and no paid leave. That racism is not something that was solved by the civil rights movement. As the skies clear and early research suggests that the reduction in fossil fuel pollution is saving lives, the costs of continuing to rely on dirty energy have become much more tangible. Watching states bid against each other for vital medical equipment while the federal government fumbles its response to the virus has made the reality of our broken politics very clear. The pandemic has reminded us that we stand and fall as a society and that the welfare of the poorest among us is integral to everyone’s welfare. It has shown us that planning for the future is essential and that, when the chips are down, a capable, responsive government is a necessity, not a dirty word. We’ve learned that when we must do something, we can: Fundamental change no longer seems impossibly out of the reach. We can do better. We already have the resources and the knowledge we need to build a more equitable, sustainable capitalism. But to get there, business will have to change how it understands its role in the world (and in the U.S. in particular) — and how it thinks about government. A New Path Forward While free markets are an unparalleled source of prosperity and freedom, the free market can only take us where we need to go if externalities such as carbon pollution are properly priced, if there is genuine freedom of opportunity, and if the rules of the game are such that competition is free and fair. Markets do not police themselves; they must be balanced by transparent, capable, democratically accountable governments. Today — in large part due to the rise of shareholder primacy, the increasing role of money in politics, and the systematic attack on government as a necessary or effective institution — that balance is largely absent. As a result, one of the fastest routes to profitability is often to persuade politicians to write the rules in your favor. Firms feel free to dump greenhouse gases into the atmosphere, for example, while spending hundreds of millions of dollars to lobby against carbon regulation. We’re even seeing this dynamic in the U.S. government’s response to the pandemic: It’s increasingly clear that an uncomfortably large share of the benefits from the recent stimulus has gone to very large firms and to very wealthy individuals. I’m not suggesting that firms neglect their duty to their shareholders. Focusing on profitability is essential if a company is to thrive in today’s brutally competitive market. But profit maximization has always been a means to an end, justified by the idea that when markets are genuinely free and fair, there’s good reason to believe they lead to both prosperity and freedom. But when markets are no longer held in check by governments that can police the rules of the game, appropriately control externalities, or provide the public goods necessary to support real opportunity, they become too powerful for their own good. The chaotic and uneven pandemic response we are experiencing today flows directly from 30 years of treating government as something that should be “drowned in the bathtub.” Now more than ever, I believe firms have not just a moral duty to contribute to the health of the institutions that keep our society strong and our capitalism genuinely free and genuinely fair, but also an economic interest in doing so. We need to rebuild our democracy, strengthen our public conversation so that it’s firmly based on facts and mutual respect, commit with everything we have to building an inclusive society for everyone, and yes, find ways to rediscover the importance of democratically accountable, capable, responsive government. Why? We cannot decarbonize the world’s energy supply without government regulating fossil fuel emissions and providing positive incentives to embrace low carbon solutions. Yes, individual firms can provide better jobs — paying employees a decent wage and providing ongoing training, among other necessary steps — but we’ll only successfully address inequality and racism at scale through structural reform, if we can do things like: provide quality education and health care to everyone, no matter their parents’ income; raise the minimum wage; and find ways to give employees more power as they negotiate with increasingly powerful firms. Most fundamentally, we’ll only rebuild trust in the political system, and with it a government that is genuinely responsive to ordinary people, if we can get money out of politics and stop tolerating business’s attacks on government. These attacks are often framed in terms of defending the free market, but too often are simply attempts to block the action we need to build a more equitable society. Collective action — a sustained effort by coalitions of firms — could make a huge difference in helping to drive this kind of institutional change. Firms are already working together to solve some of the world’s toughest problems. A third of the world’s invested capital is already committed to insisting that the firms in their portfolios plan for the challenge of climate change. Businesses across the world are increasingly coming to realize that democratically accountable, freely elected, capable governments are critical to long term economic health — and are willing to say so in public. But they need to do more. A “Kodak Moment” for the World I can feel your skepticism as I write. Can business really change — and help government change along with it? Can it embrace a version of capitalism that focuses on the longer term and the common good? Can it help to rebuild the power of the very institutions that are needed to keep it in check? I believe it can. We already know that it is possible to make money by addressing the world’s social and environmental problems. Walmart saved a billion dollars in fuel costs by increasing the efficiency of their trucking fleet. Elon Musk has revolutionized the automotive business and built a company worth more than GM and Ford combined in the process. The most successful $200M+ IPO of the last 20 years was a company that promised to replace beef with a burger made largely from soy. At Unilever, so called “purpose-driven” brands are growing 69% faster than the rest of the portfolio as consumers increasingly vote with their wallets. Change on a broader scale will be much harder. But not impossible. Think of this as a “Kodak moment” for the world. I spent the first 20 years of my career at MIT as a professor of innovation and strategy. For much of it I was quite literally the Eastman Kodak professor of management. My title was a coincidence — but a deeply ironic one, since I spent most of my time trying to understand why large, successful firms like Kodak had so much trouble responding effectively when the world around them changed. By now the company’s story is well-known: Kodak was once one of the world’s most successful firms. The firm invented classic film-based commercial photography and used it to build one of the world’s most iconic brands. As one senior vice president and director of Kodak research noted in a 1985 Wall Street Journal article, “We’re moving into an information-based company…[but] it’s very hard to find anything [with profit margins] like color photography that is legal.” But Kodak went bankrupt in 2012, having failed to master the transition to digital photography. The business community now faces a similar transition. As the Business Roundtable’s historic decision last year to “lead their companies for the benefits of all stakeholders” suggested, the vast majority of the world’s leading firms know that we must tackle the challenge of climate change, that we must find a way to ensure that everyone has a chance to share in the world’s wealth, and that it’s vital that we not let democracy lose out to either oligarchy or tyranny. We know that we need to change. But too often it’s tempting to emulate Kodak, claiming that change will come — but not now. Insisting that it’s more profitable to stick with the old ways, that if it’s really important we’ll get around to doing something new — later. Change is hard. It’s not surprising that we’re struggling to adopt new ways of thinking about the world and business’s role in it. But I am hopeful. Not optimistic, in the sense that I’m sure everything will work out just fine — I’m not sure of that at all. But hopeful. As a species, we have a gift for problem solving. Kodak failed to manage the digital transition, but Nikon, Canon and Fujifilm continue to be billion-dollar companies. Thousands of firms and millions of people are even now exploring ways to solve our common problems — for example, firms are partnering with each other and with governments to search for vaccines and to bring people back to work safely. This kind of cooperation must continue beyond the pandemic. As recent data shows, trust in business has fallen during the pandemic, but trust in government has risen dramatically. There is no better time for business to see government as a partner, not an adversary, in helping to make society work everyone — not just the lucky few. We can learn from the horrors of the pandemic. We must. We don’t need to go back to “normal” — we need to reimagine capitalism instead. We need to find a way to balance the energy of the free market with the power of competent, responsive government. Together, they can help us build a more just and sustainable world.

#### Three cap good impacts:

#### 1---War

Mousseau 19, Professor in the School of Politics, Security, and International Affairs at the University of Central Florida. (Michael, “The End of War,” International Security 44:1, 2019, https://sciences.ucf.edu/politics/wp-content/uploads/sites/29/2019/07/IS\_End-of-War.pdf)

Is war becoming obsolete? There is wide agreement among scholars that war has been in sharp decline since the defeat of the Axis powers in 1945, even as there is little agreement as to its cause.1 Realists reject the idea that this trend will continue, citing states’ concerns with the “security dilemma”: that is, in anarchy states must assume that any state that can attack will; therefore, power equals threat, and changes in relative power result in conflict and war.2 Discussing the rise of China, Graham Allison calls this condition “Thucydides’s Trap,” a reference to the ancient Greek’s claim that Sparta’s fear of Athens’ growing power led to the Peloponnesian War.3 This article argues that there is no Thucydides Trap in international politics. Rather, the world is moving rapidly toward permanent peace, possibly in our lifetime. Drawing on economic norms theory,4 I show that what sometimes appears to be a Thucydides Trap may instead be a function of factors strictly internal to states and that these factors vary among them. In brief, leaders of states with advanced market-oriented economies have foremost interests in the principle of self-determination for all states, large and small, as the foundation for a robust global marketplace. War among these states, even making preparations for war, is not possible, because they are in a natural alliance to preserve and protect the global order. In contrast, leaders of states with weak internal markets have little interest in the global marketplace; they pursue wealth not through commerce, but through wars of expansion and demands for tribute. For these states, power equals threat, and therefore they tend to balance against the power of all states. Fearing stronger states, however, minor powers with weak internal markets tend to constrain their expansionist inclinations and, for security reasons, bandwagon with the relatively benign market-oriented powers. I argue that this liberal global hierarchy is unwittingly but systematically buttressing states’ embrace of market norms and values that, if left uninterrupted, is likely to culminate in permanent world peace, perhaps even something close to harmony. My argument challenges the realist assertion that great powers are engaged in a timeless competition over global leadership, because hegemony cannot exist among great powers with weak markets; these inherently expansionist states live in constant fear and therefore normally balance against the strongest state and its allies.5 Hegemony can exist only among market-oriented powers, because only they care about global order. Yet, there can be no competition for leadership among market powers, because they always agree with the goal of their strongest member (currently the United States) to preserve and protect the global order based on the principle of selfdetermination. If another commercial power, such as a rising China, were to overtake the United States, the world would take little notice, because the new leading power would largely agree with the global rules promoted and enforced by its predecessor. Vladimir Putin’s Russia, on the other hand, seeks to create chaos around the world. Most other powers, having market-oriented economies, continue to abide by the hegemony of the United States despite its relative economic decline since the end of World War II.6 To support my theory that domestic factors determine states’ alignment decisions, I analyze the voting preferences of members of the United Nations General Assembly from 1946 to 2010. I ªnd that states with weak internal markets tend to disagree with the foreign policy preferences of the largest market power (i.e., the United States), but more so if they are major powers or have stronger rather than weaker military and economic capabilities. The power of states with robust internal markets, in contrast, appears to have no effect on their foreign policy preferences, as market-oriented states align with the market leader regardless of their power status or capabilities. I corroborate that this pattern may be a consequence of states’ interest in the global market order by ªnding that states with higher levels of exports per capita are more likely than other states to have preferences aligned with those of the United States; those with lower levels of exports are more likely to have interests that do not align with the United States, but again more so if they are stronger rather than weaker. Liberal scholars of international politics have long offered explanations for why the incidence of war may decline, generally beginning with the assumption that although the security dilemma exists, it can be overcome with the help of factors external to states.7 Neoliberal institutionalists treat states as like units and international organization as an external condition.8 Trade interdependence is dyadic and thus an external condition.9 Democracy is an internal factor, but theories of democratic peace have an external dimension: peace is the result of the expectations of states’ behavior informed by the images that leaders create of each other’s regime types.10 In contrast, I show that the security dilemma may not exist at all and how peace can emerge in anarchy with states pursuing their interests determined entirely by internal factors.11

#### 2---Climate change

Smith 19 – (Noah Smith, assistant professor of finance at Stony Brook University; “Dumping Capitalism Won’t Save the Planet”; Bloomberg; D.A. August 25th 2020, [Published April 5th 2019]; <https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-04-05/capitalism-is-more-likely-to-limit-climate-change-than-socialism>) //LFS—JCM

The climate threat is certainly dire, and carbon taxes [are unlikely](http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/10/a-carbon-tax-cant-solve-climate-change-but-we-should-do-it.html) to be enough to solve the problem. But eco-socialism is probably not going to be an effective method of addressing that threat. Dismantling an entire economic system is never easy, and probably would touch off armed conflict and major political upheaval. In the scramble to win those battles, even the socialists would almost certainly abandon their limitation on fossil-fuel use — either to support military efforts, or to keep the population from turning against them. The precedent here is the Soviet Union, whose multidecade effort to reshape its economy by force amid confrontation with the West led to profound environmental degradation. The world's climate does not have several decades to spare. Even without international conflict, there’s little guarantee that moving away from capitalism would mitigate our impact on the environment. Since socialist leader Evo Morales took power in Bolivia, living standards [have improved](https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-02-22/bolivia-s-problem-is-macroeconomics-not-socialism) substantially for the average Bolivian, which is great. But this has come at the cost of higher emissions. Meanwhile, the capitalist U.S managed to decrease its per capita emissions a bit during this same period (though since the U.S. is a rich country, its absolute level of emissions is much higher). In other words, in terms of economic growth and carbon emissions, Bolivia looks similar to more capitalist developing countries. That suggests that faced with a choice of enriching their people or helping to save the climate, even socialist leaders will often choose the former. And that same political calculus will probably hold in China and the U.S., the world’s top carbon emitters — leaders who demand draconian cuts in living standards in pursuit of environmental goals will have trouble staying in power. The best hope for the climate therefore lies in reducing the tradeoff between material prosperity and carbon emissions. That requires technology — solar, wind and nuclear power, energy storage, electric cars and other vehicles, carbon-free [cement](https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/news/worlds-first-zero-emission-cement-plant-takes-shape-in-norway/) production and so on. The best [climate](https://techcrunch.com/2019/02/15/how-to-decarbonize-america-and-the-world/) policy [plans](https://www.dataforprogress.org/green-new-deal) all involve technological improvement as a key feature. Recent developments show that the technology-centered approach can work. A [recent report](https://about.bnef.com/blog/battery-powers-latest-plunge-costs-threatens-coal-gas/) by Bloomberg New Energy Finance analyzed about 7000 projects in 46 countries, and found that large drops in the cost of solar power from photovoltaic systems, wind power and lithium-ion batteries have made utility-scale renewable electricity competitive with fossil fuels. A 76 percent decline in the cost of energy for short-term battery storage since 2012 is especially important. In a blog post, futurist and energy writer Ramez Naam [underscores](http://rameznaam.com/2019/04/02/the-third-phase-of-clean-energy-will-be-the-most-disruptive-yet/) the significance of these developments. Naam notes the important difference between renewables being cheap enough to outprice new fossil-fuel plants, and being inexpensive enough to undercut existing plants. The former is already the case across much of the world, which is among the reasons for an 84 percent [decrease](https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/mar/28/global-collapse-in-number-of-new-coal-fired-power-plants) in the number of new coal-fired plants worldwide since 2015. But when it becomes cheaper to scrap existing fossil-fuel plants and build renewables in their place, it will allow renewables to start replacing coal and gas much more quickly. Naam cites examples from Florida and [Indiana](https://www.utilitydive.com/news/even-in-indiana-new-renewables-are-cheaper-than-existing-coal-plants/540242/) where this is already being done. He cites industry predictions that replacing existing fossil-fuel plants with renewables will be economically efficient almost everywhere at some point in the next decade. Electricity is far from the only source of carbon emissions — there’s also transportation, manufacturing (especially of steel and cement), home and office heating, and agriculture to worry about. But the rapid advance of solar technology is a huge victory in the struggle against climate change, because it will allow people all over the world to have electricity without cooking the planet. And how was this victory achieved? A combination of smart government policy and private industry. Massachusetts Institute of Technology researchers Goksin Kavlak, James McNerney and Jessika Trancik in a [recent paper](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421518305196?via%253Dihub) evaluated the factors behind the solar-price decline from 1980 to 2012. They concluded that from 1980 to 2001, government-funded research and development was the main factor in bringing down costs, but from 2001 to 2012, the biggest factor was economies of scale. These economies of scale were driven by private industry increasing output, but with government subsidies helping to increase the incentive to ramp up production. It’s apparent, therefore, that both government and profit-seeking enterprises have their roles to play. Government funds the development of early-stage technology and then helps push the private sector toward adopting those technologies, while private companies compete to find ever-cheaper methods of implementation. Instead of eco-socialism, it’s eco-industrialism. If there’s any system that can beat climate change, this looks like it.

#### 3---Globalization is immensely beneficial for improving quality of life in the Global South---it’s also widely supported which proves their epistemic skepticism is from an ivory tower.

Horner et al. 18 (Rory, Global Development Institute, University of Manchester, Manchester, UK, “Globalisation, uneven development and the North–South ‘big switch’,” Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society 2018, 11, 17–33 doi:10.1093/cjres/rsx026)

Citizen surveys further reveal dramatic changes in attitudes to globalisation across and within the global North and South. While such surveys have methodological limitations,1 the results indicate distinctive trends that support the thesis of the ‘big switch’. Among people in the global South, polls have consistently found quite positive attitudes towards globalisation. In 2007, the Times of India claimed that ‘Indians believe globalisation benefits their country’, citing a poll by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and World Public Opinion that 54% of Indians answered ‘good’ compared to 30% ‘bad’ to the question of whether increasing economic connections ‘with others around the world is mostly good or bad’. More recently, Stokes (2016) reported on Pew Research Surveys from 2016 which found that 60% of Chinese think their country’s involvement in the global economy is good (compared to 23% who think it is bad), while 52% of Indians surveyed thought it was good compared to 25% who said it was a problem. A recent YouGov survey of 20,000 people across 19 countries found a majority believed that globalisation has been a force for good. That survey found the most enthusiasm for globalisation in East and South-East Asia, where over 70% in all countries believed it has been a force for good. The highest approval, 91%, was in Vietnam, a relative latecomer to globalisation (Smith, 2017).

By contrast, public support for globalisation in the global North has plummeted. Bhagwati (2004) cited an Environics International Survey presented at the 2002 World Economic Forum Meetings to argue that disillusionment with globalisation was not universal; ‘anti-globalisation sentiments are more prevalent in the rich countries of the North, while pluralities of policy makers and the public in the poor countries of the South see globalisation instead as a positive force’ (2004, 8). Although Bhagwati suggested this was an ‘ironic reversal’, it proved to be in line with a 2007 BBC World Service poll that found 57% of people in G7 countries thought the pace of globalisation was too rapid, whereas the majority of those in ~~developing~~ countries surveyed thought it was just right or too slow (e.g. IMF, 2008; Pieterse, 2012). A 2007 Pew Global Poll similarly found a decline in the percentage of people in many Northern countries who believed trade had a positive impact. In its analysis of the survey results, Kohut and Wilke (2008, 6–7) commented that ‘it is in economically stagnant Western countries that we see the most trepidation about globalisation’. Almost 10 years later, The Economist (2016) reported on a YouGov survey of 19 countries, which found that fewer than half of people in the USA, UK and France believed that globalisation is a ‘force for good’ in the world. This broad change in attitude toward globalisation is playing out in national electoral politics as well as gatherings such as the World Economic Forum and the meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation.

The ‘big switch’ and the geography of uneven development

The ‘big switch’ seemingly confounds the predictions of the most vocal proponents and critics of globalisation alike. Uneven development is dynamic and relates to differences both within and among countries (Sheppard, 2016). Naïve claims that the world is flat or that economic globalisation is ‘win-win’ have rightly been dismissed (Baldwin, 2016; Christopherson et al., 2008; Turok et al., 2017), yet it is also insufficient to suggest that globalisation simply leads to a reproduction of existing inequalities, overlooking how that unevenness may be changing as a result of new macroeconomic geographies (Peck, 2016). While trade theory could predict that there would be ‘losers’ in the global North from international economic integration, proponents of economic globalisation have asserted that they would be few in number and could be compensated. More recently, it appears that a large group of people feel more forsaken than compensated. Similarly, for those who embraced Marxian political economy, and warned of its negative consequences in the South, the apparent optimism and support for globalisation in the South may have been unexpected. The sceptical internationalists (e.g. Evans, 2008; Kaplinsky, 2001; Stiglitz, 2006) should be acknowledged, however, for forecasting downsides in the global North. As we outline below, many people in the global North have experienced relative stagnation, whereas, albeit from a very low starting point and amidst considerable inequality, many people (but not all) have experienced improved development outcomes in the global South. We then explore what this apparent ‘big switch’ may tell us about contemporary economic globalisation.

The new geography of global uneven development

Significant portions of the population in the USA and other countries in the global North have experienced limited, if any, income gains in an era of globalisation. Milanovic’s (2016) ‘elephant graph’ (Figure 1) has quickly become a popular way to demonstrate the relative stagnation experienced in North America and Europe in recent decades. Exploring changes in real incomes between 1988 and 2008, he showed that those who particularly lost out on any relative gain in income were the global upper middle class (those between the 75th and 90th percentiles on the global income distribution) and the poorest 5% of the world population. Of these least successful percentiles, 86% of the population were from mature economies in the global North (Lakner and Milanovic, 2016, 23). Considering these contrasts more widely, a growing body of evidence shows that the global North’s dominance in the global economy is receding, with the share of high-income countries in global GDP having fallen from 76.8% in 2000 to 65.2% in 2015 (see Figure 1).

A different picture emerges in the global South. In Figure 1, it was Asians who comprised 90% of the population in the percentiles which did best in terms of relative income gains from 1988 to 2008 (Lakner and Milanovic, 2016, 223). The UNDP has remarked that

A striking feature of the world scene in recent years is the transformation of many ~~developing~~ countries into dynamic economies…doing well in economic growth and trade … they are collectively bolstering world economic growth, lifting other ~~developing~~ economies, reducing poverty and increasing wealth on a grand scale. (UNDP, 2013, 43)

The share of global GDP of low and middle income countries increased from 22.5% in 2000 to 34.1% in 2015 (Figure 2). Much of this increase is accounted for by China, as well as India and Brazil. Their share of global GDP, only 4.6% in 1960, 6.6% in 1990 and 9.3% in 2000, had almost doubled in the 21st century to 18% by 2015.

The development context of the global South has changed significantly since the turn of the Millennium, across a variety of important indicators. The total number of people in the world living on less than $1.90 per day (i.e. extreme poverty) has more than halved from 1.69 billion in 1999 to 766 million in 2013. At least by official estimates, the share of the population in the global South who are living in extreme poverty has fallen considerably this century. Whereas the percentage of the population in the global South with a daily consumption level of less than $1.90 was 33.4% in 1999, it was just 13.4% in 2013.2 The percentage of the world’s countries classified by the World Bank as low-income, albeit a very low threshold, more than halved within the first 15 years of the 21st century. Moreover, the total number of countries which are highly dependent on aid (having a net ODA > 9% of GNI) has fallen considerably, from 42 in 2000 to 29 in 2015, or from 34.1% to 23.2% of all low and middle-income countries with data available over that period.3

Considered overall, in comparison with the 1990s, the global South, in aggregate, now earns a much larger share of world GDP, has more middle-income countries, more middleclass people, less aid dependency, considerably greater life expectancy and lower child and maternal mortality. Table 1 provides some summary indicators for high-income countries (HICs) and low and middle-income countries (L&MICs), as somewhat imperfect approximations for global North and South.

After two hundred years of a ‘divergence, big time’ (Pritchett, 1997) between developed and ~~developing~~ countries following the Industrial Revolution, recent measurements suggest a change in the pattern of global inequality across a number of indicators (Horner and Hulme, 2017). The Global GINI of income distribution across all individuals in the world has fallen from 69.7 in 1988 to 66.8 in 2008 and 62.5 in 2013 (World Bank, 2016, 81). Analysis presented in the World Bank’s Taking on Inequality (2016) suggests that, in 1998, 26% of global income inequality was related to differences within countries, with the remaining 74% relating to differences among countries. By 2013, these shares were 35 and 65%. Two hundred years of a great divergence between global North and South now seems to have had some reversal, although more than half of an individual’s income can be accounted for by the country where he/she lives or was born (Milanovic, 2013). Inter-country inequality, rather than intra-country inequality, is still dominant, but it accounts for a diminished share of income-based and other inequalities (World Bank, 2016).

#### Prefer our evidence over narrative pessimism---their ev succumbs to negativity biases that downplay the world’s improvements.

McAfee 19, \*Andrew Paul McAfee, a principal research scientist at MIT, is cofounder and codirector of the MIT Initiative on the Digital Economy at the MIT Sloan School of Management; (2019, “More from Less: The Surprising Story of How We Learned to Prosper Using Fewer Resources and What Happens Next”, https://b-ok.cc/book/5327561/8acdbe)

Max Roser’s Our World in Data is one of my favorite websites, for two reasons. The first is that it contains a lot of valuable information. The second is that it tells an invaluable story—an optimistic and hopeful one. The evidence presented in Our World in Data and in books like Julian Simon’s The Ultimate Resource, Bjørn Lomborg’s Skeptical Environmentalist , Steven Pinker’s Enlightenment Now , and Hans Rosling’s Factfulness shows clearly that most of the things we should care about are getting better. Not all, but most. This happy fact applies both to the state of nature and the human condition.

The Power of Negative Thinking

But do your friends and family believe that a lot of important things are getting better? Do you? If not, they and you are far from alone. Most people don’t appreciate that things are improving as the four horsemen advance. For example, Rosling writes, “Over the past 20 years, the proportion of people living in extreme poverty has almost halved. But in online polls, in most countries, fewer than 10 percent of people knew this.” Most people believe things are get ting worse. Across all countries surveyed in 2017, only 20 percent of people correctly answered that poverty rates have declined over the previous twenty years.

Why isn’t the good news sinking in? A few factors are at work. One is our basic human “negativity bias”: bad news makes a bigger impression on us and stays with us longer than does neutral or good news. Another factor is that the press tends to emphasize sensationalistic news, which is often negative. Journalism’s jaded motto is “If it bleeds, it leads.”

One other important factor, I think, was identified by the British philosopher John Stuart Mill in an 1828 speech: “I have observed that not the man who hopes when others despair, but the man who despairs when others hope, is admired by a large class of persons as a sage.” In many elite circles and publications negativity seems to be a sign of seriousness and rigor, while optimism and positivity seem naive and under-informed.

Simon, Rosling, Pinker, Roser, and others have pushed back against this institutional negativity bias. They’ve done work that is both rigorous and positive. In fact, they’ve shown that doing rigorous work—looking systematically at the best available evidence—often compels you to be positive about many things because the evidence is so encouraging.

### 1NC---AT: Racial Capitalism

#### Capitalism isn’t intrinsically racist---the relationship is contingent even if the two systems have coincided.

Go 21, Professor of Sociology and Faculty Affiliate in Asian Studies @ Boston University. He has held Visiting Fellowships and Professorships @ the London School of Economics, Pompeu Fabra University in Barcelona, University of Lucerne in Switzerland, and the Third World Studies Centerin the Philippines. (Julian, "Three Tensions in the Theory of Racial Capitalism", *Sociological Theory*, Volume: 39 issue: 1, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0735275120979822)---language> edited

Necessity, Contingency, and Difference The final tension within racial capitalism is whether the interconnectedness of racial difference and capitalism is a logical or contingent necessity.6 If, as the racial capitalism literature suggests, slavery and its associated logics of racism have been crucial for the development of capitalism, and if global capitalism today remains intertwined with racial stratification, to what extent are these relations intrinsic to capitalism or accidental? Put differently, is capitalism necessarily racist (Fraser 2019; Lemann 2020)?7 For some, the relationship is only contingent. Walzer (2020) argued that in some countries, capitalism proceeds along just fine without racial difference, and if there is racial difference on a global scale, it is historically contingent. Although the vast majority of workers are nonwhite, Walzer suggested that this is not due to any intrinsic logic of capitalism but rather the accident of demographics (because most of the world is nonwhite, the majority of the world’s workers will be nonwhite). For this reason, Walzer suggested we disavow the racial capitalism concept. Alternatively, others claim that racism is indeed intrinsic to capitalism.8 There are two versions of this claim. One is that racism is necessary to divide the working class and legitimate the rule of the bourgeoisie. Racism is an ideological necessity of capitalism, justifying its unequal relations (Camp, Heatherton, and Karuka 2019; McCarthy 2016; Taylor 2016). “Capitalism requires inequality,” suggested Gilmore (2015), “and racism enshrines it.” A very different version, coming most predominantly from Fraser (2019), is that capitalism necessarily entails relations of exploitation and expropriation that feed off each other. Exploitation is the extraction of value from “free subjects” through wage labor. But expropriation, which includes slavery and colonialism, extracts value from racialized “dependent subjects” and is what enables exploitation to happen in the first place. Expropriation is “a necessary background condition for the exploitation of ‘workers’” (Fraser 2019) and therefore for capitalism itself. Capitalism is thus logically dependent upon racism.9 So what is the answer? Again, it helps differentiate between a theory of capital and a theory of capitalism. A theory of capitalism might demonstrate that race has been historically necessary for capitalist accumulation by reference to empirical reality: historically, capitalism and race have always been intertwined. But the claim that race is a logical necessity to capitalism would have to derive from a theory of capital, not from empirics alone. One would have to deduce, from the categories of Marx’s theory, the necessity of racism or racial differentiation in society. On this score, the arguments for the logical necessity of capitalism’s entanglements with race fall short. Consider the argument that racism is necessary for capitalism because capitalism requires racist ideology to divide the working class. This is a functionalist argument that is not functionalist enough, for it effaces the logical possibility of functional substitution. We may find that racism has historically always functioned to divide the working class, but in theory other “isms” could serve the same function. There is nothing inherent to the logic of capital that requires race to be the ideology of division (Lebowitz 2006:39).10 Why not ethnicity? Why not sexuality? Consider Fraser’s argument that expropriation is intrinsic to capitalism and that racial differentiation must be too. It is plausible and indeed persuasive to claim that expropriation is necessary for capitalism, but it is less persuasive to claim that racial difference is logically necessary for expropriation. Gender could easily serve as the main axis of dependent classification (and, to feminist-Marxist thought, it has served that function), as could ethnicity, religion, sexuality, or citizenship. Fraser would have to show that expropriation, and hence capitalism, requires a racial classification as opposed to other social categories. This is a task left unfulfilled.11

### 1NC---AT: Advocacy

#### Intercommunalism is a social catastrophe and responsible for incredible amounts of human suffering.

McAfee 19, \*Andrew Paul McAfee, a principal research scientist at MIT, is cofounder and codirector of the MIT Initiative on the Digital Economy at the MIT Sloan School of Management; (2019, “More from Less: The Surprising Story of How We Learned to Prosper Using Fewer Resources and What Happens Next”, <https://b-ok.cc/book/5327561/8acdbe>) \*ability edited

Not That We Needed Another One: An Experiment in Socialism

So as regards how capitalistic a country is, all the action seems to be in the middle of the spectrum. The real fault line is right down the center: between social democracy and democratic socialism. I can’t imagine a clearer demonstration of how much it matters whether a word is used as an adjective or a noun. Social is fine. Socialism is a catastrophe.

I thought the historical record on this point, written from Moscow to Beijing to Havana, was quite clear, and that we didn’t need any more demonstrations of socialism’s too-numerous-to-list shortcomings. We didn’t even need to keep debating whether a socialist economy could work in theory (regardless of what had happened in practice) because the great Austrian British economist Friedrich Hayek laid that issue to rest.

Hayek realized that fluctuating prices for such things as aluminum and wheat are signals about scarcity and abundance. These signals cause people who buy and sell to take action (to slim, swap, optimize, evaporate, and so on). So free-floating prices in capitalist economies do an important double duty: they provide both information and incentives. Prices fixed by a socialist government do neither of those things. Hayek used this insight to shoot down the idea of socialism in 1977: “I’ve always doubted that the socialists had a leg to stand on intellectually.… Once you begin to understand that prices are an instrument of communication and guidance which embody more information than we directly have, the whole idea that you can bring about the same order… by simple direction falls to the ground.… I think that intellectually there is just nothing left of socialism.”

But in some quarters, socialism is cool again. The good news is that even as this is happening, we’re getting a detailed look, aided by all the technologies of modern media, at yet another socialist experiment as it unfolds and falls apart. The bad news is how much the people of Venezuela are suffering as they provide this lesson.

Venezuela, South America’s richest country as recently as 2001, elected the ardent socialist Hugo Chávez in 1998. He was succeeded after his 2013 death by his vice president, Nicolás Maduro. Both men gained and held on to power via elections rather than military coups or popular revolutions. For twenty years, then, the country has been a clear example of democratic socialism.

Both Chávez and Maduro closely followed the Socialism 101 playbook. They nationalized companies in industries from oil services to fertilizer production to banking to glassmaking. Instead of relying on markets to bring goods and services to the poor, the government established and ran misiones that provided meals and groceries. The state also bought food on international markets then sold it internally at subsidized prices (in other words, at a loss). Currency controls were put in place for most businesses, which meant the end of free markets for other moneys such as the US dollar. A set of “fair price” laws set not only prices but also acceptable profit margins and products. And so on.

Chávez and Maduro thus chipped away at or knocked over all the pillars of capitalism within their country. A team of economic researchers could hardly have created a better field experiment on the effects of socialism. However, no ethical team would have tried to run such an experiment because of the damage it would likely cause. Any economist or historian who wasn’t a committed Marxist could have predicted at least some of the results of Venezuela’s plunge into socialism. However, I think few would have predicted the actual scale of the economic catastrophe and the accompanying human suffering.

Socialism can be slow-acting poison, and the first decade of “Chavism” wasn’t too bad (at least in comparison to what came later). Along with much of the rest of the world Venezuela entered a recession in 2009. It recovered by 2011, however, mainly because of the strength of its oil industry, which accounts for 95 percent of its total exports. Venezuela has the largest proven oil reserves in the world and so benefited greatly from oil prices that largely stayed above $100 per barrel. High oil prices allowed the government to subsidize many other things and kept its socialist experiment going. Oil prices plummeted in 2014, however, and things began to fall apart quickly. Food became scarce because the government could no longer afford to buy as much of it on international markets. Many private companies had stopped making food products that were being given away for free by the state. Other producers had been ~~crippled~~ undermined by currency and price controls or were badly mismanaged after nationalization.

The grim consequences of bungling a nation’s food supply were quick to appear. By mid-2017 Venezuelans were referring to being on an involuntary “Maduro diet”; adults lost an average of nearly twenty pounds in a year. Malnutrition among children was already widespread in 2016; but according to one doctor, “In 2017 the increase in malnourished patients has been terrible. Children arrive with the same weight and height of a newborn.”

In early 2016 oil prices more than doubled from their low point, leading many to hope that Venezuela could recover. The price rise did little good, though, because the country had lost the ability to produce oil. Total output dropped by 29 percent in 2017, a decline greater than that experienced by Iraq after the American invasion in 2003. A former director of the state-run oil company explained, “In Venezuela, there is no war, nor strike. What’s left of the oil industry is crumbling on its own” because of incompetence and corruption.

Other industries didn’t fare much better. The IMF estimated that the country’s GDP dropped 35 percent between 2013 and 2017. According to economist Ricardo Hausmann, this is the largest economic collapse ever seen in the history of not only Latin America but also Western Europe and North America. It dwarfed even the Great Depression. The government tried to make up for this huge fall in output by printing a great deal of money. As is always the case, this did nothing except cause prices to spike. The IMF predicted that Venezuelan inflation could hit 13,000 percent in 2018, but this estimate proved far too conservative. By November of that year, the annual inflation rate was 1,290,000 percent. Three months later, the IMF estimated that it was 10 million percent.

As economic mismanagement at every level intensified, so did human misery. Crime skyrocketed; by 2016 Venezuela had the second-highest homicide rate in the world after El Salvador. The government resorted to increasingly brutal measures to fight crime and shore up support in the poor neighborhoods that had been the base of Chavism. One investigation tallied more than eight thousand extrajudicial killings by Venezuelan police and soldiers in less than three years.

The neutron bomb was a nuclear weapon designed to kill as many people as possible while minimizing damage to buildings and other physical infrastructure. Socialism in Venezuela functioned as a kind of inverse neutron bomb: it didn’t kill people directly, but inflicted massive damage on societal infrastructure.

Everything from health care to money to the production of goods and services to public safety was devastated by it.

As socialism’s detonations continued, Venezuelans fled their country in ever-larger numbers. By early 2018 at least five thousand people a day were streaming into Colombia and other neighboring countries. Unable to find work and desperate to feed their families, many women turned to prostitution. “We’ve got lots of teachers, some doctors, many professional women, and one petroleum engineer,” reported a brothel owner in a Colombian border town. “ All of them showed up with their degrees in hand.”

Back in Venezuela conditions continued to worsen. The country was increasingly referred to as a war zone, but that comparison is in some ways too kind. The government went to great lengths to hide the true magnitude of its health crises, but even official statistics put its infant mortality rate higher than that of Syria in 2016.

In a May 2018 election that was boycotted by the main opposition party and widely regarded as far from free and fair, Maduro was reelected with 68 percent of the vote. By early 2019, though, his presidency was in trouble. More than 80 percent of Venezuelans wanted him to resign, in large part because of his government’s terrible mismanagement of the economy. Hyperinflation and other self-inflicted wounds had reduced almost 90 percent of the population to poverty. Opposition leader Juan Guaidó declared himself the interim president of the country on January 23, 2019. By mid-February more than fifty countries had recognized him as the rightful president of Venezuela.

UK prime minister Margaret Thatcher famously observed in 1976, “The trouble with socialism is that eventually you run out of other people’s money.” Maduro eventually faced a related crisis: his country ran out of food and other goods because its money and just about everything else related to its socialist economy ran out of credibility.

The Problem with Capitalism Is That There Isn’t Enough of It

But hasn’t capitalism also let people down in Latin America and the world’s other less developed regions? Perhaps its failures haven’t been as rapid and grotesque as socialism’s in Venezuela, but hasn’t it still failed? Ricardo Hausmann argues that it hasn’t. It’s worked quite well where it has taken hold. The problem, he points out, is that it hasn’t been allowed to spread widely. As he puts it, “The capitalist reorganization of production petered out in the developing world, leaving the vast majority of the labor force outside its control. The numbers are astounding. While only one in nine people in the United States are self-employed, the proportion in India is nineteen out of twenty. Fewer than one-fifth of workers in Peru are employed [in] private businesses.… In Mexico, about one in three are.” In the rich world self-employed people are often freelancers or consultants, interacting professionally with companies when they choose to. In the developing world, however, the great majority of the self-employed would love to have a job with a company, but none are available. So people have to try to make a living as solo farmers, merchants, or tradespeople.

Hausmann has observed that different regions in developing countries have different economies, and he notes a fascinating pattern: where there is more capitalism, there is more prosperity. In the Mexican state of Nuevo León, for example, two-thirds of the people are employed by companies. In Chiapas, meanwhile, fewer than 15 percent are. Average incomes in Nuevo León are nine times higher. Hausmann doesn’t think this is a coincidence: “The developing world’s fundamental problem is that capitalism has not reorganized production and employment in the poorest countries and regions, leaving the bulk of the labor force outside its scope of operation.”

#### Armed opposition to the state fails.

**DeBoer 16**, Ph.D. from Purdue University, (Fredrik Deboer, March 15th, 2016, “c’mon, guys,” http://fredrikdeboer.com/2016/03/15/cmon-guys/)

I could be wrong about the short-term dangers, and the stakes are incredibly high. But in the end we’re left with the same old question: what tactics will actually work to secure a better world?

In a sharp, sober piece about the meaning of left-wing political violence in the 1970s, Tim Barker writes “If you can’t acknowledge radical violence, radicals are reduced to mere victims of repression, rather than political actors who made definite tactical choices under given political circumstances.” The problem, as Barker goes on to imply, is those tactical choices: in today’s America they will essentially never break on the side of armed opposition against the state. The government knows everything about you, I’m sorry to say, your movements and your associations and the books you read and the things you buy and what you’re saying to the people you communicate with. That’s simply on the level of information before we even get to the state’s incredible capacity to inflict violence.

Look, the world has changed. The relative military capacity of regular people compared to establishment governments has changed, especially in fully developed, technology-enabled countries like the United States. The Czar had his armies, yes, but the Czar’s armies depended on manpower above and beyond everything else. The fighting was still mostly different groups of people with rifles shooting at each other. If tomorrow you could rally as many people as the Bolsheviks had at their revolutionary peak, you’re still left in a world of F-15s, drones, and cluster bombs. And that’s to say nothing of the fact that establishment governments in the developed world can rely on the numbing agents of capitalist luxuries and the American dream to damper revolutionary enthusiasm even among the many millions who have been marginalized and impoverished. This just isn’t 1950s Cuba, guys. It’s just not. In a very real way, modern technology effectively lowers the odds of armed political revolution in a country like the United States to zero, and so much the worse for us.

This isn’t fatalism. It doesn’t mean there’s no hope. It means that there is little alternative to organization, to changing minds through committed political action and using the available nonviolent means to create change: a concert of grassroots organizing, labor tactics, and partisan politics. Those things aren’t exactly likely to work, either, but they’re a hell of a lot more plausible than us dweebs taking the Pentagon. Bernie Sanders isn’t really a socialist, but he’s a social democrat that moves the conversation to the left, and if people are dedicated and committed to organizing, the local, state, and national candidates he inspires will move it further to the left still. You got any better suggestions?

#### *Even if* revolutionary movements are successful, the chaos of the transition causes mass violence and repression that repeats the pitfalls of capitalism.

Wright 17, \*Erik Olin Wright, Professor of Sociology at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, USA. Director of A. E. Havens Center for Social Justice, University of Wisconsin-Madison, (2017, “How to be an Anti-capitalist for the 21st Century”, https://www.redalyc.org/journal/124/12452111002/html/)

Smashing This is the classic strategic logic of revolutionaries. The rationale goes something like this: The system is rotten. All efforts to make life tolerable within capitalism will eventually fail. From time to time small reforms that improve the lives of people may be possible when popular forces are strong, but such improvements will always be fragile, vulnerable to attack and reversible. Ultimately it is an illusion that capitalism can be rendered a benign social order in which ordinary people can live flourishing, meaningful lives. At its core, capitalism is unreformable. The only hope is to destroy it, sweep away the rubble and then build an alternative. As the closing words of the early twentieth century song Solidarity Forever proclaim, “We can bring to birth a new world from the ashes of the old.” The full realization of the emancipatory alternative may be gradual, but the necessary condition for such a gradual transition is a ruptural break in the existing system of power. But how to do this? How is it possible for anti-capitalist forces to amass sufficient power to destroy capitalism and replace it with a better alternative? This is indeed a daunting task, for the power of dominant classes that makes reform an illusion also blocks the revolutionary goal of a rupture in the system. Anti-capitalist revolutionary theory, informed by the writings of Marx and extended by Lenin, Gramsci and others, offered an attractive argument about how this could take place: While it is true that much of the time capitalism seems unassailable, it is also a deeply contradictory system, prone to disruptions and crises. Sometimes those crises reach an intensity which makes the system as a whole fragile, vulnerable to challenge. In the strongest versions of the theory, there are even underlying tendencies in the “laws of motion” of capitalism for the intensity of such system-weakening crises to increase over time, so that in the long-term capitalism becomes unsustainable; it destroys its own conditions of existence. But even if there is no systematic tendency for crises to become ever-worse, what can be predicted is that periodically there will be intense capitalist economic crises in which the system becomes vulnerable and ruptures become possible. The problem for a revolutionary party, therefore, is to be in a position to take advantage of the opportunity created by such system-level crises to lead a mass mobilization to seize state power, either through elections or through an insurrectionary overthrow of the existing regime. Once in control of the state, the first task is to rapidly refashion the state itself to make it a suitable weapon of ruptural transformation, and then use that power to repress the opposition of the dominant classes and their allies, dismantle the pivotal power structures of capitalism, and build the necessary institutions for the long-term development of an alternative economic system. In the 20th century, various versions of this general line of reasoning animated the imagination of revolutionaries around the world. Revolutionary Marxism infused struggles with hope and optimism, for it not only provided a potent indictment of the world as it existed, but also provided a plausible scenario for how an emancipatory alternative could be realized. This gave people courage, sustaining the belief that they were on the side of history and that the enormous commitment and sacrifices they were called on to make in their struggles against capitalism had real prospects of eventually succeeding. And sometimes, if rarely, such struggles did culminate in the revolutionary seizure of state power. The results of such revolutionary seizures of power, however, were never the creation of a democratic, egalitarian, emancipatory alternative to capitalism. While revolutions in the name of socialism and communism did demonstrate that it was possible “to build a new world from the ashes of the old,” and in certain specific ways they may have improved the material conditions of life of most people for a period of time, the evidence of the heroic attempts at rupture in the 20th century is that they do not produce the kind of new world envisioned in revolutionary ideology. It is one thing to burn down old institutions and social structures; it is quite another to build emancipatory new institutions from the ashes. Why the revolutions of the 20th century never resulted in robust, sustainable human emancipation is, of course, a hotly debated matter. Some people argue that this was just because of the historically specific, unfavorable circumstances of the attempts at system-wide ruptures. Revolutions occurred in economically backward societies, surrounded by powerful enemies. Some argue it was because of strategic errors of the leadership of those revolutions. Others indict the motives of leadership: the leaders that triumphed in the course of these revolutions were motivated by desires for status and power rather than the empowerment and wellbeing of the masses. And still others argue that failure is intrinsic to any attempt at radical rupture in a social system. There are too many moving parts, too much complexity and too many unintended consequences. As a result, attempts at system-rupture will inevitably tend to unravel into such chaos that revolutionary elites, regardless of their motives, will be compelled to resort to pervasive violence and repression to sustain social order. Such violence, in turn, destroys the possibility for a genuinely democratic, participatory process of building a new society.

#### Myopic focus on capitalism’s pitfalls is dangerous---singular instances of failure can’t overcome the vast material, empirical benefits capitalism has over any alternative.

Norberg 03, MA in History of Ideas with focus on economics and philosophy (Jonah, “In Defense of Global Capitalism,” pg. 290)

Capitalism is not a perfect system, and it is not good for everyone all the time. Critics of globalization are good at pointing out individual harms—a factory that has closed down, a wage that has been reduced. Such things do happen, but by concentrating solely on individual instances, one may miss the larger reality of how a political or economic system generally works and what fantastic values it confers on the great majority compared with other alternatives. Problems are found in every political and economic system, but rejecting all systems is not an option. Hunting down negative examples of what can happen in a market economy is easy enough. By that method water or fire can be proved to be bad things, because some people drown and some get burned to death, but this isn’t the full picture.

A myopic focus on capitalism’s imperfections ignores the freedom and independence that it confers on people who have never experienced anything but oppression. It also disregards the calm and steady progress that is the basic rule of a society with a market economy. There is nothing wrong with identifying problems and mishaps in a predominantly successful system if one does so with the constructive intent of rectifying or alleviating them. But someone who condemns the system as such is obligated to answer this question: What political and economic system could manage things better? Never before in human history has prosperity grown so rapidly and poverty declined so heavily. Is there any evidence, either in history or in the world around us, to suggest that another system could do as well?

#### Capitalism is inevitable.

Wiedmann et al. 20, \*Thomas Wiedmann, PhD, Associate Professor of Sustainability Research at the University of New South Wales. \*Manfred Lenzen. PhD, Professor of Sustainability Research at Integrated Sustainability Analysis (ISA) in the School of Physics at the University of Sydney. \*Lorenz T. Keyßer, Institute for Environmental Decisions, Department of Environmental Systems Science, ETH Zürich. \*Julia K. Steinberger, PhD, Professor of Ecological Economics at the University of Lausanne. (6-19-2020, "Scientists’ warning on affluence", *Nature Communications*, https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-020-16941-y?fbclid=IwAR0AG6Lz\_CcR2XY0uxVvKNmjnlWP0YLXl6iBcUfl8gcZmTjR7-ZVb3W3oes)

Super-affluent consumers and growth imperatives

Growth imperatives are active at multiple levels, making the pursuit of economic growth (net investment, i.e. investment above depreciation) a necessity for different actors and leading to social and economic instability in the absence of it7,52,60. Following a Marxian perspective as put forward by Pirgmaier and Steinberger61, growth imperatives can be attributed to capitalism as the currently dominant socio-economic system in affluent countries7,51,62, although this is debated by other scholars52. To structure this topic, we will discuss different affected actors separately, namely corporations, states and individuals, following Richters and Siemoneit60. Most importantly, we address the role of the super-affluent consumers within a society, which overlap with powerful fractions of the capitalist class. From a Marxian perspective, this social class is structurally defined by its position in the capitalist production process, as financially tied with the function of capital63. In capitalism, workers are separated from the means of production, implying that they must compete in labour markets to sell their labour power to capitalists in order to earn a living.

Even though some small- and medium-sized businesses manage to refrain from pursuing growth, e.g. due to a low competition intensity in niche markets, or lack of financial debt imperatives, this cannot be said for most firms64. In capitalism, firms need to compete in the market, leading to a necessity to reinvest profits into more efficient production processes to minimise costs (e.g. through replacing human labour power with machines and positive returns to scale), innovation of new products and/or advertising to convince consumers to buy more7,61,62. As a result, the average energy intensity of labour is now twice as high as in 195060. As long as a firm has a competitive advantage, there is a strong incentive to sell as much as possible. Financial markets are crucial to enable this constant expansion by providing (interest-bearing) capital and channelling it where it is most profitable58,61,63. If a firm fails to stay competitive, it either goes bankrupt or is taken over by a more successful business. Under normal economic conditions, this capitalist competition is expected to lead to aggregate growth dynamics7,62,63,65.

However, two factors exist that further strengthen this growth dynamic60. Firstly, if labour productivity continuously rises, then aggregate economic growth becomes necessary to keep employment constant, otherwise technological unemployment results. This creates one of the imperatives for capitalist states to foster aggregate growth, since with worsening economic conditions and high unemployment, tax revenues shrink, e.g. from labour and value-added taxes, while social security expenditures rise60,62. Adding to this, states compete with other states geopolitically and in providing favourable conditions for capital, while capitalists have the resources to influence political decisions in their favour. If economic conditions are expected to deteriorate, e.g. due to unplanned recession or progressive political change, firms can threaten capital flight, financial markets react and investor as well as consumer confidence shrink51,58,60. Secondly, consumers usually increase their consumption in tune with increasing production60. This process can be at least in part explained by substantial advertising efforts by firms47,52,66. However, further mechanisms are at play as explained further below.

Following this analysis, it is not surprising that the growth paradigm is hegemonic, i.e. the perception that economic growth solves all kinds of societal problems, that it equals progress, power and welfare and that it can be made practically endless through some form of supposedly green or sustainable growth59. Taken together, the described dynamics create multiple dependencies of workers, firms and states on a well-functioning capital accumulation and thus wield more material, institutional and discursive power (e.g. for political lobbying) to capitalists who are usually the most affluent consumers61,67. Even if different fractions of the capitalist class have manifold and competing interests which need to be constantly renegotiated, there is a common interest in maintaining the capitalist system and favourable conditions for capital accumulation, e.g. through aggregate growth and high consumption51,62. How this political corruption by the super-affluent plays out in practice is well documented, e.g. for the meat industry in Denmark6.

#### Intercommunalism is magnitudes times worse for the environment.

Regan 19, vice president of research at the[PROPERTY AND ENVIRONMENT RESEARCH CENTER](https://www.perc.org/) (PERC) in Bozeman, Mont, (Shawn, May 16th, 2019, “Socialism Is Bad for the Environment”, https://www.nationalreview.com/magazine/2019/06/03/socialism-is-bad-for-the-environment/)

As the Soviet Union began to collapse, the socialist economist Robert Heilbroner admitted that central planning had failed economically but said we needed “to rethink the meaning of socialism.” Now it was the thing that had to emerge if humanity was to cope with “the one transcendent challenge that faces it within a thinkable timespan.” Heilbroner considered this one thing to be “the ecological burden that economic growth is placing on the environment.” Markets may be better at allocating resources, Heilbroner thought, but only socialism could avoid ecological disaster.

Not long after, however, it became clear that the socialist economies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union were not just economic failures; they were also environmental catastrophes. Economist Jeffrey Sachs noted at the time that the socialist nations had “some of the worst environmental problems in the entire globe.” Air and water pollution abounded. By one estimate, in the late 1980s, particulate air pollution was 13 times higher per unit of GDP in Central and Eastern Europe than in Western Europe. Levels of gaseous air pollution were twice as high as this. Wastewater pollution was three times higher.

And people’s health was suffering as a result. Respiratory illnesses from pollution were rampant. In East Germany,  60 percent of the population suffered from respiratory ailments. In Leningrad (now St. Petersburg), nearly half of all children had intestinal disorders caused by contaminated water. Children in Poland were found to have five times more lead in their blood than children in Western Europe. Conditions were so bad that, as Heilbroner acknowledged, the Soviet Union became the first industrialized country in history to experience a prolonged peacetime decline in average life expectancy.

As the Iron Curtain lifted, socialism’s dirty environmental secret was exposed: Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union were the most polluted and degraded places on earth. “When historians finally conduct an autopsy of the Soviet Union and Soviet Communism,” economist Murray Feshbach and journalist Alfred Friendly Jr. wrote in 1992, “they may reach the verdict of death by ecocide.”

Consider the destruction of the Aral Sea between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, which has been called “one of the planet’s worst environmental disasters.” Once the world’s fourth-largest inland body of water, it shrank to less than half its original size because of Soviet economic policies. Fixated on making the USSR self-sufficient in cotton production, central planners mandated industrial agriculture throughout the arid region. Massive water diversions for irrigation reduced the sea’s inflows to a trickle, causing the biggest manmade loss of water in history. Fishing villages became dry and landlocked. Some, such as the former port city of Muynak, now lie more than 75 miles from the sea.

The desiccation of the Aral Sea also caused severe health problems throughout the region. As the waters receded, the sea’s salty floor was exposed, along with pesticides that had accumulated from agricultural operations. All this was then carried by strong winds to nearby communities. Respiratory problems, throat cancer, and other illnesses became more common as the pollutants were deposited in the lungs of millions. The human and environmental consequences are still being felt. Today, infant-mortality rates in the Aral Sea region remain significantly higher than the national average in Uzbekistan, and children there experience similarly high rates of anemia, diarrheal diseases, and other illnesses caused by exposure to toxic contaminants.

How can this be? “Environmental deterioration was not supposed to occur under socialism,” Cuban-American researchers Sergio Díaz-Briquets and Jorge Pérez-López wrote in a detailed study of Cuba’s environmental legacy. “According to conventional Marxist-Leninist dogma, environmental deterioration was precipitated by the logic of capitalism and its relentless pursuit of profits.” Socialism, on the other hand, would avoid capitalism’s excesses. “Guided by ‘scientific’ principles, socialism’s goal was a classless and bountiful society,” they explained, “populated by men and women living in harmony with each other and the environment.”

But this was clearly not the case in the Soviet empire. Nor was it in Cuba, whose environmental record after decades of socialist control was described by Díaz-Briquets and Pérez-López as “far different from the utopian view.” The West, meanwhile, had not only the consumer goods that socialist societies lacked but also a cleaner environment.

One explanation for the disparity is that central planners, unlike markets, grossly misallocate resources, as a matter of routine. Energy prices, for example, were highly subsidized in the socialist economies of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. As a result, industrial production was far more energy-intensive throughout the socialist world than in Western European economies — five to ten times higher, according to one estimate — leading to more pollution. A 1992 World Bank study found that more than half of the air pollution in the former Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe could be attributed to subsidized energy pricing during this period.

A related problem was the fixation of socialist planners on heavy industry at the expense of the environment. “The singular dominant fact of the Soviet economic strategy,” Jeffrey Sachs has noted, “was the subordination of all human and economic goals to the development of heavy industry.” Industrial pollution from factories in Eastern Europe was so bad that Time described it as the region “where the sky stays dark.” Acid rain in Krakow severely damaged the city’s historic structures and buildings, some of which required renovations, and even corroded the faces of many centuries-old statues.

Of course, industry behind the Iron Curtain was anything but efficient, and central planning caused excessive use of natural resources. A 1991 study by Mikhail Bernstam found that market economies used about one-third as much energy and steel per unit of GDP as did socialist countries. Likewise, Polish economist Tomasz Zylicz found that the non-market economies of Central and Eastern Europe required two to three times more inputs to produce a given output than did Western European economies. (The former Soviet world, as well as China, also emitted several times more carbon  per unit of GDP than the United States did — a trend that continues today.) Simply put, market economies make more with less and are therefore better for the environment.

Socialist planners, on the other hand, lack the knowledge necessary to rationally coordinate economic activity. Moreover, bureaucratic constraints make accurate price-setting impossible. In their 1989 book The Turning Point, Soviet economists Nikolai Shmelev and Vladimir Popov offered an illustrative example. To bolster the production of gloves, the Soviet government more than doubled the price it paid for moleskin. Warehouses soon filled with mole pelts, but glovemakers were unable to use them all, so many rotted. As the economists explained:

The Ministry of Light Industry has already requested Goskomtsen [the State Committee on Prices] twice to lower the purchasing prices, but “the question has not been decided” yet. And this is not surprising. Its members are too busy to decide. They have no time: besides setting prices on these pelts, they have to keep track of another 24 million prices. And how can they possibly know how much to lower the price today, so they won’t have to raise it tomorrow?

Therein lies a crucial flaw in socialist economic logic, and one that has real environmental consequences: Whereas a capitalist firm has ample incentive to act on such information to economize on the use of natural resources, socialist planners have no such motivation — Soviet bureaucracies, Shmelev and Popov noted, were “able only to correct the most obvious price disproportions several years after” they appeared — nor do they have the knowledge needed to accurately set millions of prices at once. And if there are no market prices to convey accurate information about the value of scarce natural resources, there is little chance of conserving them.

Finally, there is the issue of property rights. In a socialist society without them, it is impossible to hold individuals or governments accountable for environmental damages: Planners can increase industrial output without compensating those who bear its costs in the form of pollution. In a capitalist society, property rights offer protection against environmental harms and give resource owners incentives to conserve.

Socialism’s environmental record is just as bad elsewhere. As Díaz-Briquets and Pérez-López document, in Cuba, socialists’ quest to maximize production at all costs has caused extensive air, soil, and water pollution. And in Venezuela, socialist policies have contaminated the nation’s drinking-water supplies, fueled rampant deforestation and unrestrained mining activity, and caused frequent oil spills attributed to neglect and mismanagement by the state-owned energy company.

As socialist ideas capture the American imagination — and are often portrayed, as with the Green New Deal, as necessary to avoid environmental catastrophe — it’s important to remember socialism’s dismal environmental legacy. Capitalism may be a dirty word these days, but when it comes to producing the prosperity and creativity necessary to sustain a clean environment, it’s still the best system we’ve got.

# 2NC

# 1NR

## Case

### 1NR---AT: Fascism

#### Capitalism doesn’t cause fascism---it is the ultimate economic system for strengthening autonomy and freedom from oppression.

Cudd 10, Anne Cudd is Professor of Philosophy and Associate Dean for Humanities, University of Kansas. She is the author of Analyzing Oppression (2006), and co-edited (with Anita Superson) Theorizing Backlash (2002) and (with Robin Andreason) Feminist Theory (2005). (2010, “Capitalism, For and Against A Feminist Debate”, Cambridge University Press)

Capitalist markets and freedom

Freedom is the ultimate appeal of capitalism. The early proponents of capitalism, such as Adam Smith , as well as more recent defenders, including economists from such diverse political motivations as Milton Friedman and Amartya Sen, have all defended capitalism on this ground. While efficiency and the ability to raise living standards is an important reason to maintain free markets, and an aspect of the freedom that Sen extols, the freedoms provided by capitalism are intrinsically valuable and partially constitutive of freedom. As Sen argues, regardless of the efficiencies of the market, “the more immediate case for the freedom of market transaction lies in the basic importance of that freedom itself.” 97 While securing this freedom is straight- forward and simple for middle and upper class men of the First World, for women and others oppressed by traditional norms of their cultures, the freedom to transact in the marketplace can be liberating on a far wider scale. Thus, I will argue as well that capitalism enhances women’s freedom.

The free market system of capitalism enhances freedom in three ways. Traditionally freedom of exchange has been seen as a basic form of individual freedom, with which it would be wrong to interfere, and in this sense is a basic, negative freedom like the freedom of speech, assembly, the press, or conscience. Gerald Gaus, a liberal defender of the morality of markets, summarizes the liberal case for freedom in capitalism: “classical liberalism embraces market relations because (but not, of course, only because) they (1) are essentially free, (2) respect the actual choices of individuals, and (3) legitimately express different individuals’ rational decisions about the proper choice between competing ends, goods, and values.” 98 Market freedom is necessary to respect individuals as free choosers and designers of their own “experiments in living,” as Mill famously puts it. 99 Free markets also have positive aspects, however, in providing opportunities by increasing persons’ material wealth in order to choose things that they value. Another aspect of the positive freedom that markets promote is the freedom of persons to develop their autonomy as decision makers, and to find opportunities to escape from oppressive traditional roles. Markets also promote a third, more controversial, sense of freedom in that they allow persons to interact in mutually beneficial ways even when they do not know each other or have any other traditional reason to care about the other. I call this sense of freedom “social freedom.” In each of these ways – negative, positive, and social – markets have much, and in some cases even more, to offer to women, as women have been more confined by traditional roles to a con- strained family life, deprived of a fair distribution of benefits and burdens of family life, and treated as second-class citizens in their communities. While capitalism has already, as we have seen, brought great advances in the realm of negative and positive liberties, capitalism’s ability to destruct the old and create new forms of community offer a vision of freedom that is yet to be fulfilled. In what follows I will explore each of the three senses of freedom to see how capitalism is related to its realization.

Negative freedom is the freedom not to be interfered with, and a list of such freedoms typically includes civil and political freedoms, but also the economic freedoms to engage in market transactions and to use or benefit from one’s legitimately owned property. These latter two – the freedom to exchange and the freedom to use or benefit from one’s property – are two of the hallmarks of capitalism as I have defined it in terms of the private ownership of capital, free wage labor, and free market conditions. I also added the freedom from discrimination constraint, which is another aspect of negative freedom. Capitalist systems, whether any of the forms discussed at the beginning of my contribution or the enlightened form that I defend, do place some constraints on trade. Taxation by government to provide public goods that the market does not efficiently provide or to internalize negative externalities that traders would otherwise ignore to the detriment of bystanders places legitimate constraints on trade. So, too, do reasonable restrictions on trade designed to certify the quality of some goods. But capitalism by definition defends the basic freedom to open or close a business, to contract one’s labor with the highest bidder, and to exchange goods without attend- ing to the social status of the trading partners. Negative freedoms for the serf, the bonded laborer, or the slave would be freedom to leave the master – to not be impeded, whether by custom or law – to freely engage in wage labor. The nondiscrimination constraint also comprises this freedom; it is the freedom not to be constrained by features about one that are fixed at birth and that have nothing to do with one’s talents or abilities.

As Sen explains, there are four ways in which free markets are needed now to uphold negative freedom or, put another way, to resist tyranny and enslavement. 100 First, they allow persons to escape the bonds of traditional labor bondage by being able to seek wage employment away from traditional bosses. In many rural areas people farm land for traditional landowners, and markets for labor allow them to escape this bondage. This is the freedom capitalism offers that Marx recognized as an improvement over feudalism, where serfs had no choice in their place or way of life. Second, the communism of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, and still existing in North Korea and Cuba, denied the freedoms to engage in exchange or choose where one lives. That these freedoms are now less abridged makes it no less important to recognize that they are important negative freedoms that capitalism upholds. Third, free markets help to liberate children from bonded labor. Children in parts of South Asia are particularly susceptible to being placed in bondage to higher caste men, who put them to work making carpets or bricks for a very small pittance paid to their parents. The main reason for child labor is parental poverty. Where parents can earn more by their labor, they send their children to school. Even if the parents are still too poor or shortsighted or lack schools, if the children can earn wages by their labor, then they can do better than they do in bondage, where they have no income and no ability to resist harsh, violent treatment. Fourth, market employment for women is crucially important for their economic independence and for getting a better deal in intra-household distributions.

Outside employment gives women opportunities that are not directly tied to their menfolk. It makes them able to bargain for a better share of the family wealth and income, but also for less of the burden of chores, or enables them to pay others to do some of the work. The opportunity to work in the same kinds of jobs as men eventually wears away gender distinctions, or makes those distinctions less confining and more equal in terms of status. In this way, enlarging women’s negative freedom also tends toward enlarging their positive freedom.

Positive freedom is defined in two different ways: either as simply the positive supports that individual persons need in order to live a life with enough good choices to deserve the name freedom, or as also including the internal qualities of character that allow persons to be autonomous or self-lawmakers. The two are connected in that persons are typically unable to develop their capacities to plan their lives or live according to principles if they do not have enough to eat, or they have to worry about their physical health and security, or if they have not had an adequate education. Positive freedom in the sense of autonomy recognizes that completely unconstrained behavior is not necessarily action motivated by desires that are one’s own. And positive freedom in the sense of social supports recognizes that without the wherewithal (material and psychological) to act on one’s own desires, there can be no freedom. Sen refers to these as the process and opportunity aspects of freedom. 101 In this book I do not take a stand on which is the proper sense of positive freedom; both are clearly desirable as described. Instead, I argue that both senses of positive freedom are supported in capitalism, though not necessarily guaranteed. In the first sense, capitalism supports, but does not guarantee, the ability of persons to secure their own livelihood and material well-being. As we have seen, capitalism has increased life expectancy, improved health, and decreased fertility and child mortality on average. Increasing wealth is also correlated with increasing educational levels, and decreased fertility is correlated specifically with increasing female education. 102 Capitalism, as a highly cooperative and social form of production, requires socially coordinated and regulated efforts. Thus, capitalism is clearly a form of social provision in design as well as in outcome. Capitalism does not guarantee that any given individual will develop or exercise autonomy, but rather supplies external supports for autonomy by offering opportunities to plan and to raise one’s level of material well-being. In particular, capitalism does not guarantee that persons will develop autonomous desires, and in some ways may be seen as encouraging nonautonomous or what Kant would have called heteronomous desires, a point I will return to in section 6.

The most important objection against capitalism, however, is that it enables gross inequalities in wealth and income. When these inequalities also entail absolute impoverishment, so that persons do not have the ability to choose between decent ways of life, then this is clearly a failure. But capitalism raises the overall level of material wealth in a society, and so allows for the possibility of addressing such abject poverty. The fact that market interactions lead to inequalities is not, in itself, a denial of freedom. But it does pose the possibility of inequalities in power that can lead to positive and social unfreedoms, and indeed this is borne out in the actual world in many ways. Perhaps the worst sort is where wealth buys political influence in a nominally democratic country.

Before leaving the topic of inequality, however, it is important to point out that capitalism is not alone in supporting gross inequalities, but the way in which it does so is acceptable where it is not in other systems. North Korea, a socialist totalitarian system, creates gross inequalities of wealth through political power that controls resources. The leader and his minions live in vast wealth while much of the population teeters on the brink of famine. The communist systems of the Soviet Union and China were also notorious for the vast consumption and indulgence of their leaders compared with the average citizen, and notoriously one had to be a party member in the Soviet Union in order to own a car. Traditional societies are no better; the patriarchs of many such societies are rich while the young and the less powerful labor for far less. But in each of these cases the wealth comes not through productive effort, but rather through political control, and in some cases through inheritance. While the leader of North Korea is in charge simply by virtue of being the son of the previous leader, the richest capitalists in the world were not born to the previous generation of the wealthiest. It is true that Bill Gates and Warren Buffet were born to upper-middle-class families, but their vast wealth was earned through innovation, skills, and talents, and not through inheritance. This is not to say that inequality in wealth is not a problem, nor to say that opportunities to achieve great wealth are fairly distributed in capitalism. They are not, and that is a serious moral issue. But it is to say that socialist and traditional societies have at least equally difficult problems to address in terms of inequality in wealth and power . In the final section of my contribution, I will argue that an enlightened capitalism must do better to address inequalities that either amount to absolute poverty or cause political and social inequalities that deny free- dom. It is also important to note, however, that inequality that does not rule out good options for life does not seriously interfere with individual positive freedom, in either sense of the term. One need not live in the best of all possible worlds, after all, in order to be free enough to pursue one’s own projects.

Positive freedom as autonomy requires that one is not manipulated by the social structure under which one lives. One’s desires must be one’s own and one’s beliefs must be rationally generated for one’s actions to be entirely autonomous. Isaiah Berlin , who draws the distinction between negative and positive freedom in this latter way, ultimately rejects the idea of positive freedom because, he argues, to posit a breach of positive freedom one would have to impose desires on individuals that they do not acknowledge. 103 For governments to attempt to guarantee positive freedom, then, they would have to posit a good for their citizens and entice them to seek it, that is, in Rousseau’s famous phrase, to force their citizens to be free. Berlin, as a liberal, argues that freedom requires merely imposing no impediments to individuals’ given preferences. Positive freedom, Berlin concludes, insinuates a totalitarian menace.

Although Berlin’s is a commonly cited libertarian line of argument that is often aligned with defenders of capitalism, I want to argue that Berlin’s distinction between positive and negative freedom is drawn incorrectly, and that positive freedom in the sense of autonomy is not hostile to capitalism. It is especially important for women and other oppressed groups to attend to internal, psychological impediments to freedom that are generated by social constraints on what they can do and be. Negative and positive freedom cannot be easily separated for two reasons. First, a persistent lack of negative freedom for a social group harms the individuals of that group psychologically, causing them to lack positive freedom. Second, even though the idea that a government might posit an individual’s good for her raises the specter of totalitarianism, that fact does not vitiate the claim that an individual’s freedom can be compromised by a lack of vision of viable alternative options. A person can lack freedom with- out there being a clear way for the person to attain freedom in the future. Violations of negative freedom turn out to result in deeper harms that slide over into the kinds of harms that violations of positive freedom entail.

This is particularly the case for victims of oppression, and particularly for women. 104 Women are often convinced by many different social norms, expectations, and incentives to live within constraints that similarly placed (in terms of race, class, culture, and time period) men need not consider. This sort of internally constrained vision, whether it is because of false consciousness , shame, stereotype, or trauma, is the kind of violation of their positive freedom that should most concern feminists. Capitalism, by providing an option outside kin and traditional community norms for independence and social power, can allow women the wherewithal to escape these constraints. Even if a particular woman does not choose to work outside the home or compete in the marketplace as an entrepreneur, the fact that women have this option under capitalism increases the freedom of all women. Enlarging the set of things that women are seen as cap- able of can reduce the sense that women have that they are inferior, and this can increase their confidence in a wider set of social circumstances. It puts the lie to the idea that women are incapable, and helps women to stand up to ill-treatment and violence.

While many philosophers recognize negative and positive freedoms in quite similar ways, a third concept of freedom has been proposed by different philosophers in quite different ways. Quentin Skinner’s third concept of liberty is the lack of an ongoing threat to one’s freedom of thought and expression. 105 Skinner argues that this requires the existence of a noncoercive government or absence of a threat of domination by one. This form, however, is reducible to negative freedom from interference by government, insofar as it refers to legitimate forms of coercion. A legitimate government may legitimately apply coercive measures to assure the good of the whole or the protection of others who have a rightful claim to such protection, provided that the measures are, in Thomas Scanlon’s terms, something that no reason- able person could reject. Skinner clearly does not mean to rule that out, but rather to rule out coercion that is wrongful. Yet this is already covered under the concept of negative freedom; one is not free in the negative sense if one is coercively dominated by one’s government. However, it goes too far to suggest that one is not free if one is threatened by domination of a coercive government. In this sense Skinner’s third concept of freedom is similar to Philip Pettit’s view of freedom as nondomination. Both are mistaken to take the (implied) ability to pose a threat to be the same thing as a coercive threat.

If freedom in this third sense is compromised by even the threat of coercion or domination, then the free market is not free in this sense. But both Skinner and Pettit claim too much for a concept of freedom. As Gaus argues, it fails to distinguish between power to and power over. 106 Wealth gives one the power to afford many trades, but it does not give one the ability to exercise power over another by forcing a person to make a trade she or he does not want, and thereby limit that person’s liberty. While the classical liberal claims that market transactions are free as long as there is no force, fraud, or coercive threat, Pettit denies this with an argument that freedom requires nondomination, and one dominates another if one has the ability to exercise power over another (including by means of financial clout, technical advantage, or political power). To avoid domination, he argues, one has to have anti-power. Rule of law gives anti-power. Gaus argues that Pettit’s view is profoundly anti-market because the market will inevitably lead to unequal wealth and income, and this would always involves domination on Pettit’s understand- ing, since greater success would allow one to potentially exercise power over another. Thus, the market is full of relations of domination – everyone except Bill Gates is dominated, after all, on this analysis. Furthermore, since equals have equal ability to attack each other, if we all had equal power to achieve our ends, we would all be unfree. Such an analysis trivializes the concept of domination. If Skinner or Pettit are understood to sim- ply mean that freedom requires that there is no active threat or active domination, then this requirement can be seen as entailed already by negative freedom, since an active threat or domination is a direct constraint of one’s basic civil, political, and property rights. If Skinner or Pettit are taken to mean that there can be no potential threat, however, then their concept of freedom falls prey to this triviality objection. And insofar as these concepts are positive, that is, perhaps requiring social supports for individuals to be able to fully participate in social cooperation, they are reducible to positive freedom.

Berlin discussed and rejected a third sense of freedom that he finds in the claims of colonial oppressed persons, and which emerged in the writings of philosophers writing about colonial oppression, such as Jean-Paul Sartre and Frantz Fanon . Freeing oneself from oppression requires negative freedoms in the form of freedom of protest, and positive freedom. In progressive hands, “negative freedom is the capacity to destabilize identities and interrupt norms.” 107 This form of freedom, defended as well in Cynthia Willett’s Irony in the Age of Empire , is the desire for sociality and belonging within one’s group, and recognition of one’s social group and its distinctive values and norms from out- siders. She calls this third form of freedom, “solidarity.” Willett’s third freedom as solidarity requires something more than those two concepts, though. In particular, it requires the existence of social bonds that tie the individuals beyond their ability to resist and set themselves free. I want to resist the notion that this is a form of freedom, regardless of how good social bonds might feel. For they are the very forces of unfreedom in many cases. Bonds of solidarity both enable and constrain. The first, enabling, is indeed freedom, but the second, constraint, is not; it is the dark, exclusionary side of solidarity. Willett does not embrace any particular terms on which social solidarity might be forged. Cornel West’s appeal to nuclear family norms as form of third freedom raises her suspicions. She writes, “West’s appeal to the virtues of sacrifice may not subjugate women to patriarchal control, but it doesn’t sound like the battle cry for liberation that we might desire.” 108 But her suspicions here raise for me the question of why, then, she would align social bonds with freedom. If concepts of freedom proceed from sources of anxiety, I cannot think of anything that produces more anxiety than the requirement that I follow the norms of some particular community, without any opportunity to opt out of that community.

In my view we want freedom to pursue or reject social bonds – not to be dominated or threatened with constraints by others who would prevent our ability to pursue or imagine them. This is most important for members of social groups that have been oppressed for generations, as women have been. Such persons have a constrained vision of what is possible for them, and need to be able to see beyond these constraints that have been erected by others, but reinforced internally. Nonetheless, a third form of freedom can emerge under the right circumstances, namely the social conditions which allow and support individual autonomy for each person, which I call “social freedom.” Social freedom transcends positive freedom by considering the needs of each, not just of individuals one at a time. Autonomy requires an absence of oppressive social constraints that prevent free self- development. Systematic violence, economic discrimination and segregation, social shaming, and vicious stereotyping are among the most autonomy-defeating forces. Social freedom poses a collective obligation to provide for the education of the next generation, not because they are “our children,” as if we own them or they are our personal, genetic or property-inheriting legacy, but because children are at that stage where they need to be taught to develop their capacities if they are to be autonomous adults. Mill argued for this on the utilitarian grounds that more and higher quality pleasure is created that way. 109 Other moral and political theories can generate this obligation as well. For example, a contractarian can argue that by educating children in this way we provide more and better opportunities for cooperation for mutual advantage. A Kantian can simply argue that it is the only way to treat children as ends in themselves. Social freedom can be described as the Rawlsian union of social unions , which he argues arises in the society that is structured by his two principles of justice, and involves each taking pleasure in the achievements, the flourishing, of others. I take it that this is true of the society of free persons, which is not only free of cur- rent oppressions, but whose members seek to free all persons from oppression. For in such a society the individuals are able to seek their own good with good will toward others as well. They seek to encourage diversity and enhance the freedom of others. They take pleasure in and identify with the accomplishments of others. And further, they come to see their own freedom as connected to that of the others.

Capitalism supports social freedom, but, as with positive freedom, does not guarantee it. That would be too much to ask of an economic system alone. As I have argued elsewhere, capitalism embraces the positive aspects of competition. 110 Competition in capitalism is valuable because it allows many different persons to succeed at least in part. For businesses to be profitable there must be consumers to buy their products, and for there to be consumers to buy products, there must be a large sector of the population that earns enough through their labor to consume, and a significant number who can invest and create new opportunities for work. Capitalism thrives where the situation is more like what game theorists call a cooperative competition; that is, the players of the game have interests that are partly shared and partly opposed. The optimal and equilibrium outcome arises when each pursues a strategy that both maximizes their outcome, but also leads to the others being better off, as WE1 suggests. This contrasts sharply with the situation of either the zero-sum game, where there is only one winner and all the others are losers, or worse, a game in which, when each of the players pursues their own best strategies, a socially suboptimal outcome arises (such as in the Prisoner’s Dilemma).

This optimism about capitalism and its role in raising the sights of women is as applicable in poor, developing countries as it is in rich, First World ones. As Sen has argued, freedom is both constitutive of development seen in a progressive light, but also instrumental toward that form of development. Development as he understands it requires making human lives better on a variety of levels that he calls “capabilities.” Included among these capabilities are the abilities that I have listed as the interests of persons, and as the requirements of autonomy. Not only are negative and positive freedoms constitutive of development, though. Social freedom arises from the development of these freedoms as well. Capitalism is not the only route to development, but development seems, empirically, not to be complete without opening up markets to relatively free trade. Sen illustrates this by pointing to the development in China , which moved to a market-oriented economy in 1991. 111 While pre-reform China pursued basic education and health care for all, it lacked democratic freedoms, and this meant less responsiveness to famine and social crises. China suffered an enormous famine, in which 30 million people died, during the Great Leap Forward of 1958–61. Sen credits democracy with preventing any famine in India since independence in 1947. The development of capitalist markets has raised the overall level of income in China , however, to the point where it is unlikely to suffer another such catastrophe, despite the lack of democracy.

### 1NR---AT: Climate Change

#### No impact to warming and biodiversity.

Kareiva & Carranza 18, \*Director of the Institute of the Environment and Sustainability at UCLA, Pritzker Distinguished Professor in Environment & Sustainability and Chair, Doctorate, in the Environmental Science and Engineering program, \*\*PhD Student at University of California, Riverside. (Peter, Valerie, “Existential risk due to ecosystem collapse: Nature strikes back”, *Futures*, 102, pg. 39-50, doi: 10.1016/j.futures.2018.01.001)

While there are data that relate local reductions in species richness to altered ecosystem function, these results do not point to substantial existential risks. The data are small-scale experiments in which plant productivity, or nutrient retention is reduced as species number declines locally (Vellend, 2017), or are local observations of increased variability in fisheries yield when stock diversity is lost (Schindler et al., 2010). Those are not existential risks. To make the link even more tenuous, there is little evidence that biodiversity is even declining at local scales (Vellend et al 2017; Vellend et al., 2013). Total planetary biodiversity may be in decline, but local and regional biodiversity is often staying the same because species from elsewhere replace local losses, albeit homogenizing the world in the process. Although the majority of conservation scientists are likely to flinch at this conclusion, there is growing skepticism regarding the strength of evidence linking trends in biodiversity loss to an existential risk for humans (Maier, 2012; Vellend, 2014). Obviously if all biodiversity disappeared civilization would end—but no one is forecasting the loss of all species. It seems plausible that the loss of 90% of the world’s species could also be apocalyptic, but not one is predicting that degree of biodiversity loss either. Tragic, but plausible is the possibility our planet suffering a loss of as many as half of its species. If global biodiversity were halved, but at the same time locally the number of species stayed relatively stable, what would be the mechanism for an end-of-civilization or even end of human prosperity scenario? Extinctions and biodiversity loss are ethical and spiritual losses, but perhaps not an existential risk.

What about the remaining eight planetary boundaries? Stratospheric ozone depletion is one—but thanks to the Montreal Protocol ozone depletion is being reversed (Hand, 2016). Disruptions of the nitrogen cycle and of the phosphorous cycle have also been proposed as representing potential planetary boundaries (one boundary for nitrogen and one boundary for phosphorous). There are compelling data linking excesses in these nutrients to environmental damage. For example, over-application of fertilizer in Midwestern USA has led to dead zones in the Gulf of Mexico. Similarly, excessive nitrogen has polluted groundwater in California to such an extent that it is unsuitable for drinking and some rural communities are forced to drink bottled water. However, these impacts are local. At the same time that there is too much N loading in the US, there is a need for more N in Africa as a way of increasing agricultural yields (Mueller et al., 2012). While the disruption of nitrogen and phosphorous cycles clearly perturb local ecosystems, end-of-the-world scenarios seem a bit far-fetched.

Another hypothesized planetary boundary entails the conversion of natural habitats to agricultural land. The mechanism by which too much agricultural land could cause a crisis is unclear—unless it is because land conversion causes so much biodiversity loss that is species extinctions that are the proximate cause of an eco-catastrophe. Excessive chemical pollution and excessive atmospheric aerosol loading have each been suggested as planetary boundaries as well. In the case of these pollution boundaries, there are well-documented mechanisms by which surpassing some concentration of a pollutant inflicts severe human health hazards. There is abundant evidence linking chemical and aerosol pollution to higher mortality and lower reproductive success in humans, which in turn could cause a major die-off. It is perhaps appropriate then that when Hollywood envisions an unlivable world, it often invokes a story of humans poisoning themselves. That said, it is doubtful that we will poison ourselves towards extinction. Data show that as nations develop and increase their wealth, they tend to clean up their air and water and reduce environmental pollution (Flörke et al., 2013; Hao & Wang, 2005). In addition, as economies become more circular (see Mathews & Tan, 2016), environmental damage due to waste products is likely to decline. The key point is that the pollutants associated with the planetary boundaries are so widely recognized, and the consequences of local toxic events are so immediate, that it is reasonable to expect national governments to act before we suffer a planetary ecocatastrophe.


### 1NR---AT: Racial Capitalism

### 1NR---!---Poverty


#### Global poverty and inequality are declining, leading to better wellbeing and health outcomes---prefer raw data, their evidence is narrative pessimism.

Will Koehrsen, 19, Will Koehrsen is a Data Scientist at Feature Labs, and a Data Science Communicator and Advocate. “The Disappearing Poor”, <https://towardsdatascience.com/the-disappearing-poor-6c68789e5a53>


How is it possible for people in a supposedly literate society like the US to be so wrong about reality? I don’t like to place blame, but in this case, it’s likely justified: the media has succeeded in a campaign to misinform us about the world. Instead of reporting facts, they have chosen to activate our natural inclination towards xenophobia (fear of outsiders) by convincing us there is a “developed world” with well-off people, and then there is everyone else, a mass of poor hordes that will never be able to rise from poverty. Fortunately, armed with the right data, we can correct our wrong beliefs about poverty. On doing so, we discoverable a remarkable fact: over the past few decades, people all over the world have undergone a remarkable increase in prosperity, resulting in measurably better living standards for billions of people. This is episode one of [the Reality Project,](https://medium.com/@williamkoehrsen/announcing-the-reality-project-e16cc71abb64) a weekly series dedicated to becoming less wrong about the world with data. The Facts about Global Poverty and Income First, we need to look at the statistics. The single best resource on this topic is the [Our World in Data “Global Extreme Poverty” page.](https://ourworldindata.org/extreme-poverty) You can view all the numbers there, but one chart suffices to show the drastic decline in poverty:



Global share of the world population in extreme poverty. We can see that the definition of poverty varies by institution, but no matter which definition we use, the rates have drastically increased. Sure, the rate is decreasing, but because there are more people, doesn’t that mean more people are still poor? Nice try nightly news, but the number of people living in poverty has also declined precipitously, by over 1.2 billion since 1990.



Number of people living in extreme poverty. Where do these people go as they rise from extreme poverty? Simple: into the global middle class. As of this writing, [about 85% of people in the world (6 billion out of 7 billion)](https://www.gatesnotes.com/Books/Factfulness?WT.mc_id=04_03_2018_10_Factfulness_BG-media_&WT.tsrc=BGmedia) are at or above the middle part of the global income scale. Making a distinction between “developed” and “developing” is the wrong way of looking at the world: there are not two income levels, but rather a smooth scale which people everywhere are rapidly climbing. We can observe the drastic increase in worldwide wealth in the numbers. As global poverty declines, incomes increase as shown in GDP per capita over time ([from the Our World in Data “Economic Growth” page](https://ourworldindata.org/economic-growth)): Gross Domestic Product Per Capita around the world. [CHART OMITTED] So, the facts are unequivocal that poverty is declining and incomes are increasing at an extremely rapid pace, but does this actually matter? It is possible that people are making more money but not having better lives? Why Wealth Matters: Rich Countries are Better Places to Live All of this may look nice, but you may be wondering if the rise in wealth actually means that people are better off. Well, based on the following chart showing life dissatisfaction vs GDP per capita, the answer is a resounding yes. Dissatisfaction in Living vs GDP [(Source)](https://ourworldindata.org/extreme-poverty) [CHART OMITTED] As wealth increases, people become more satisfied with life. Money is not a magical cure for all ills, and the [effects only persist up to a certain income level](https://www.visualcapitalist.com/relationship-money-happiness/) but wealth is positive because of the side effects it brings with it: lower infant mortality, more educational opportunities, and fewer working hours. It can be easy to lose sight of the humans in all the numbers so it’s critical to remember that behind every one of these data points is a person. Billions of people rising out of poverty means mothers who don’t have to bury their children because [care improves with wealth](https://ourworldindata.org/health-meta), girls who are able to attend high school, and families that are living healthier, happier lives. I’m not very good at talking about individual humans, but Hans Rosling provides stories (in addition to facts) in his excellent book Factfulness. As for me, I’ll end this section with another chart from Our World in Data which demonstrates why less poverty is positive: [CHART OMITTED] Average Number of Years of Schooling vs Poverty Levels The data could not be more clear: around the world, humans are rising out of poverty and into the middle class. As a consequence, they are living longer, going to school more, working less, and leading more enjoyable lives. Cause of the global decline in poverty There are likely many factors at play behind this decline (as with any human phenomenon) but I’ll focus on the most compelling argument: commerce. (For a full treatment of this subject, see Matt Ridley’s The Rational Optimist). For hundreds of thousands of years, humans engaged in zero-sum interactions: one person stole or killed another person, so someone’s gain was offset by someone else’s loss. In this system, the overall state of humanity could improve only glacially if at all ([new tools](https://www2.palomar.edu/anthro/homo/homo_4.htm) that raised living standards spread very slowly when communication was limited to walking speed). However, [beginning around 1000 AD in Europe](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/commercial-revolution-of-the-middle-ages-9501350/27C2AF7F2C913BADCDC29631B71EA7BF), a new form of interaction emerged: economic exchanges in which both parties came out better off. This invention, [known as commerce,](https://www.amazon.com/Great-Transformation-Political-Economic-Origins/dp/080705643X) completely changed the game: people were now able to enter into positive-sum exchanges where both parties gained. This is a fundamental building block of civilization: in commerce, both the person selling a good and the person buying a good come out ahead. For most of history, humanity had a constant amount of material wealth which could change hands but did not increase overall. With the invention of commerce, the size of the economic pie itself increases as people trade goods and specialize. Both within and between country exchanges lead to a [division of labor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Division_of_labour) wherein people or countries specialize in fulfilling one role, leading to [massive increases in efficiency](https://ourworldindata.org/trade-and-globalization). It took humans a long time to figure out, but once we created exchanges and market economies, we started on the incredible upward journey in wealth that continues to this day. We can see the beneficial effects of trade in recent years on the following chart. As countries trade more, they grow wealthier: [CHART OMITTED] Change in trade 1945–2014 versus change in wealth Don’t mistake me for a free-market evangelist. Before I began my efforts to get less wrong about the world through data, I was an avowed Socialist who upheld the Nordic countries as paragons to emulate. However, my exploration of the numbers has led to the conclusion that free markets and the exchange they enable are the [drivers for escaping poverty](https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/08/does-capitalism-cause-poverty/). I also still believe in the role of government: [tight government controls in areas like environmental protection](https://ourworldindata.org/air-pollution#dirty-then-clean-the-environmental-kuznets-curve-in-air-pollution) and worker rights are critical for making sure that increased wealth does not come at the cost of environmental devastation. The remarkable ability of commerce to lift people out of poverty can be seen in China, which over the past 40 years has undergone the most incredible wealth increase in history. As described in [How China Escaped the Poverty Trap](https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/1501700200/ref=as_li_tf_til?tag=foreaffamaga-20&camp=0&creative=0&linkCode=as1&creativeASIN=1501700200), China’s extraordinary escape from poverty occurred as the communist leaders gradually opened the nation to commerce, crucially, trade with other nations. In 1978, China allowed foreign trade, and [in the 40 years since, has once again](https://thediplomat.com/2018/06/chinas-reform-and-opening-40-years-and-counting/) become a world power. Along the way, the living standards of hundreds of millions of people has been raised. [CHART OMITTED] China’s incredible rise in GDP per capita (Not only does commerce lead to rising income, but it also leads to decreasing rates of violence within and between nations. As documented by Steven Pinker in The Better Angels of Our Nature, when it is cheaper to buy something from someone than to steal it, economics wins out. Our neighbors become more valuable to us alive than dead which means less killing and more trading. This is known as the theory of gentle commerce.) Caveats While the long-term picture is overwhelmingly positive, it’s important to also focus on the realities that still need to be improved. At the moment, there are remain hundreds of millions of people in extreme poverty around the world and every one of these people deserves to rise into the middle class. The unfortunate reality is that the vast proportion of the world’s poor are in Africa where groups like the [United Nations are working to end poverty](https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/poverty/) through targeted spending programs and the institution of social safety nets. [CHART OMITTED] Where extreme poverty still exists ([source](https://www.visualcapitalist.com/decline-extreme-poverty-perspective/)) There are around 750 million people still in extreme poverty today. Nonetheless, considering 1.2 billion people moved out of extreme poverty from 1990–2015, there is every indication that extreme poverty can be ended. Furthermore, any time the issue of income is brought up, we have to mention income inequality. If countries are getting richer, but the wealth is going to fewer people, then is humanity really better off? Once again, it’s worth looking at the data, this time on inequality both within and between countries. We’ll turn to the Our World in Data articles “[Income Inequality”](https://ourworldindata.org/income-inequality) and [“Global Economic Inequality”](https://ourworldindata.org/global-economic-inequality) for the facts. Fortunately, the numbers again provide an optimistic answer. While within-country inequality has increased in a few countries, overall, global inequality has decreased and is projected to continue to decrease. From the following plot, we can see that some countries have experienced an increase in inequality within their borders if we define inequality as the share of total income going to the top 1%. (This definition [may have some issues](https://ourworldindata.org/income-inequality#within-country-inequality-in-rich-countries)). [CHART OMITTED] Share of income going to top 1% in selected nations. On the other hand, global economic inequality has declined:



Global income distribution showing decline in [Gini coefficient](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gini_coefficient). In summary, when looking at inequalities, the wealth distribution may be getting more skewed within some countries, but overall, because overall levels of wealth have increased most rapidly in the poorest nations, even those at the bottom of the income level are better off. I won’t go into the [debate about whether inequality](https://growthlab.cid.harvard.edu/news/what-should-we-do-about-inequality) is even negative, but, taking a long-term worldwide view of the situation, it does not appear to be worse now. Conclusions The news is not only misinforming you about the world but, by promoting a false picture, it’s stealing something valuable: the joy that comes with seeing the world is getting better. While it’s important to be realistic about the challenges we face in the short term, it’s also critical to take a look at the big picture and realize that all of our collective efforts are making a difference.

### 1NR---Turn---Antitrust

### 1NR---!---Healthcare

### 1NR---Turn---Cap Good

### 1NR---Turn---Sustainability

### 1NC---AT: Innovation

#### Their method dooms innovation

Kornai 13, \*János Kornai is a Hungarian economist and the Allie S. Freed Professor of Economics Emeritus at Harvard and Professor Emeritus at Corvinus University of Budapest; (János, November 6th, 2013, “Dynamism, Rivalry, and the Surplus Economy”, DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199334766.001.0001, Google Books)

After these sad stories of frustrated inventors, we turn to the innovation phase. Surely, even in the socialist system, many individuals had entrepreneurial talent, but it was lying dormant. Perhaps a large project’s leader could, to a certain extent, unfold his talent, provided that he was picked for his position because of his abilities and not his party connections. Still, the inherent characteristics of the system did not allow the development of a Schumpeterian-type entrepreneurship. 22 Let us return, one by one, to the conditions reviewed earlier when discussing capitalism, and study the situation under the socialist system.

A. Centralization, bureaucratic commands, and permissions. The plan of technical innovation is one chapter in the state plan. The central planners set key changes to be carried out regarding the composition and the quality, together with the production technology, of the products. What follows is the disaggregation of the central-plan numbers into plans for sectors, for subsectors, and, at the end, to companies. The “command economy” means, among other things, that firms receive detailed orders about when they should replace one product with a new one, and which old machinery or technology should be replaced with a new one. Before the final approval of the plan, company managers are allowed to make suggestions, so, among other things, they can initiate the adaptation of a new product or a new technology; that is to say, they can join in the process of innovation diffusion. However, they must ask for permission for all significant initiatives. If an action happens to be on large scale, even their immediate superiors cannot decide by themselves, but, instead, they must turn to the higher levels of the hierarchy for approval. The more extensive an initiative is, the higher one has to go for the final decision, and the longer the bureaucratic process preceding the actual action. 23

As opposed to the situation just described, if, in capitalism, a very promising innovation is rejected by the first company, another one may be willing to embrace it. This is made possible by decentralization, private property, and the market. In the centralized socialist economies, the innovative idea follows the official pathways, and in the case of a declared negative decision, no appeal can be made.

B. No (or only insignificant) reward. If the higher authority deems a technical innovation in a factory unit successful, the manager and perhaps his immediate colleagues receive a bonus, an amount equal one or two months of salary, at best.

C. There is no competition between producers and sellers. Production is strongly concentrated. Many companies enjoy monopolist positions, or at least a (regional) monopoly in producing an entire group of products. The chronic shortage of products creates monopolistic behavior even when many producers operate in parallel. The shortage economy, one of the strongest system-specific properties of socialism, ~~paralyzes~~ impedes the forceful engine of innovation, the incentive to fight for the favors of the customer ( Kornai 1971 ; 1980; 1992, chapters 11 – 12 ). The producer/seller is not compelled to attract the buyer by offering him a new and better product, since the latter is happy to get anything in the shop, even an obsolete and poor-quality product.

There are examples of inventive activities motivated by chronic shortages: ingeniously created substitutes for missing materials or machinery parts (Laki 1984 –1985). These results of the inventors’ creative mind, however, do not become widespread, commercially successful innovations in the Schumpeterian sense. 25 Table 2.1 features only one revolutionary innovation that did not appear first in a capitalist country but, rather, in the Soviet Union: synthetic rubber. Its inventor had been doing research on the subject for decades; the employment of it in industry was rendered necessary by the shortage of natural rubber.

D. The tight limits of experimenting. Capitalism allows for hundreds or thousands of barren or barely fruitful attempts, so that, afterward, one out of the hundreds or thousands would succeed and bring immense success. In the socialist planned economy, actors are inclined to avoid risks. As a result, the application of revolutionarily significant innovations are more or less excluded, since those always mean a leap into the dark, as success is necessarily unpredictable. As far as followers are concerned, some economies follow up quickly, others slowly. The socialist economies belong to the group characterized by the slowest pace. They prefer to maintain the already known, old production procedures, and produce the old well-tried products; new technologies and new products have too many uncertain characteristics making the planning of the directives difficult.

E. There is no capital waiting to be utilized; investment allocation is rigid. Central planning is not miserly with the resources devoted to capital formation. The share of investment carved out from the total output is typically higher than in the capitalist economies. However, this enormous volume is appropriated ahead of time to the last penny. Moreover, most of the time over-allocation takes place; in other words, the ensemble of all project plans prescribes the requisition of more resources than the required amount to execute the plan. It never happens that unallocated capital is waiting for someone with a good idea. The allocators do not search for an entrepreneur waiting to step forward with a proposal for innovation. Flexible capital markets are unknown. Instead, the rigid and bureaucratic regulation of project activities takes place, and to devote capital resources to activities with possibly uncertain outcomes is unconceivable. No foolish minister of industry or factory manager could be found who would demand money for ventures admitting in advance that the money may be wasted and the innovation may not succeed. 26

At this point, it is worth running through points A to E again about the description of the mechanisms of innovation, because these points are actually the consequences of the basic characteristics of the capitalist and the socialist systems. The reviewed phenomena are the direct results of private property and market coordination in one system and of public property and bureaucratic coordination in the other.

### 1NR---AT: Financialization

#### No impact to boom and bust cycles---recessions are small and short.

Ormerod 10, \*Paul Ormerod is the author of The Death of Economics, Butterfly Economics and Why Most Things Fail. He studied economics at Cambridge and his career has spanned the academic and practical business worlds, including working at the Economist and as a director of the Henley Centre for Forecasting. He is a Fellow of the British Academy of Social Science and has been awarded a DSchonoris causafor his contribution to economics by the University of Durham; (February 2010, “Risk, Recessions and the Resilience of the Capitalist Economies”, https://www.jstor.org/stable/40468455)

Brief Remarks and Conclusion

The aim of this paper is to establish stylised facts on the duration and size of recessions in the capitalist economies. The track record of forecasting recessions is extremely poor, so an appreciation of the distribution of the size and length of recessions is important in assessing risks for policy-makers in both the public and private sectors.

Evidence is taken from 17 Western economies over a long period of time, from 1871 to 2007. By the former date, all these economies can be considered to be essentially industrial rather than agricultural, in other words, modern capitalist economies.

Two definitions of a recession are considered. First, the conventional one of a recession being years in which the growth rate of real GDP is less than zero. Second, years in which the level of real GDP remains below its previous peak value. The qualitative nature of the results is robust with respect to the choice of definition.

A striking feature of the data is the resilience of the economies. The clear majority recessions last for just a single year, and only a small minority persists for more than 2 years.

A plausible reason for this is that most recessions are essentially inventory cycles. During the upswing, businesses tend to become too optimistic about future prospects. As a result, production begins to run ahead of sales and inventory levels rise. Firms then cut back on production in order to restore inventories to more reasonable levels. As part of this process, fixed investment projects may be postponed. Temporary reductions in capital expenditure plus actions to reduce inventory levels are of themselves inherently of short duration. The adjustment takes place quickly.

### 1NR---!---War

#### Here’s his conclusion in that section

Lucas Hahn 16, Bryant University. April, 2016. Global Economic Expansion and the Prevalence of Militarized Interstate Disputes.

Closing Remarks on the Literature Review

What this literature review should make abundantly clear is that there is no solid consensus about whether or not global economic expansion actually increases or decreases militarized interstate disputes. Furthermore, many of the aforementioned economic factors that may or may not lead to violent conflict are all highly interrelated.

### 1NR---Climate Change

### 1NR---AT: Bio and Nanoweapons

#### No emerging tech impact.

Sechser et al. 19, \*Todd S., Pamela Feinour Edmonds and Franklin S. Edmonds, Jr. Discovery Professor of Politics and Public Policy at the University of Virginia and Senior Fellow at the Miller Center of Public Affairs, \*\*Neil Narang, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Santa Barbara, \*\*\*Caitlin Talmadge, Associate Professor of Security Studies in the School of Foreign at Georgetown University. ( “Emerging technologies and strategic stability in peacetime, crisis, and war”, *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 42:6, pg. 728-729)

Yet the history of technological revolutions counsels against alarmism. Extrapolating from current technological trends is problematic, both because technologies often do not live up to their promise, and because technologies often have countervailing or conditional effects that can temper their negative consequences. Thus, the fear that emerging technologies will necessarily cause sudden and spectacular changes to international politics should be treated with caution. There are at least two reasons to be circumspect. First, very few technologies fundamentally reshape the dynamics of international conflict. Historically, most technological innovations have amounted to incremental advancements, and some have disappeared into irrelevance despite widespread hype about their promise. For example, the introduction of chemical weapons was widely expected to immediately change the nature of warfare and deterrence after the British army first used poison gas on the battlefield during World War I. Yet chemical weapons quickly turned out to be less practical, easier to counter, and less effective than conventional high-explosives in inflicting damage and disrupting enemy operations.6 Other technologies have become important only after advancements in other areas allowed them to reach their full potential: until armies developed tactics for effectively employing firearms, for instance, these weapons had little effect on the balance of power. And even when technologies do have significant strategic consequences, they often take decades to emerge, as the invention of airplanes and tanks illustrates. In short, it is easy to exaggerate the strategic effects of nascent technologies.7 Second, even if today’s emerging technologies are poised to drive important changes in the international system, they are likely to have variegated and even contradictory effects. Technologies may be destabilising under some conditions, but stabilising in others. Furthermore, other factors are likely to mediate the effects of new technologies on the international system, including geography, the distribution of material power, military strategy, domestic and organisational politics, and social and cultural variables, to name only a few.8 Consequently, the strategic effects of new technologies often defy simple classification. Indeed, more than 70 years after nuclear weapons emerged as a new technology, their consequences for stability continue to be debated.9

### 2AC---AT: Hickel

#### Hickel is wrong and McAfee is correct---cherry-picks data and misinterprets evidence.

Bailey 19, \*Ronald Bailey is the science correspondent for Reason and the author of the books [The End of Doom: Environmental Renewal in the Twenty-first Century](https://reason.com/eod) (July 2015) and [Liberation Biology: The Moral and Scientific Case for the Biotech Revolution](http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/1591022274/reasonmagazineA/); (Prometheus, 2005). (January 31st, 2019, “Global Poverty Decline Denialism”, https://reason.com/2019/01/31/global-poverty-decline-denialism/)

Some gloomsters perversely refuse to acknowledge when a glass is even half empty, especially when doing so cuts against their ideological sensitivities. One ploy is to pour the data into a bigger glass and hope that no one notices. London School of Economics anthropologist Jason Hickel has given us a near-perfect example of this sort of sleight-of-hand in Guardian column headlined "[Bill Gates says poverty is decreasing. He couldn't be more wrong](https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/jan/29/bill-gates-davos-global-poverty-infographic-neoliberal)."

At this month's meeting of the World Economic Forum in Davis, Gates cited data that show the proportion of people living in extreme poverty declining from 94 percent in 1820 to only 10 percent today. "The claim is simple and compelling," asserts Hickel. "And it's completely wrong."

Actually, it's Hickel who gets it entirely wrong.

Gates' alleged offense is to have shown a slide devised by the folks at the invaluable [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/) project. As you can see, it tracks six positive economic and social trends over the past 200 years:

Our World in Data

Hickel mischaracterizes that first chart as a count of "people living in poverty." Then he complains that the cutoff—an income equivalent to $1.90 per person per day—is "obscenely low." But absolutely nobody is claiming that living on $1.90 a day is a picnic. The condition being measured here isn't poverty but extreme poverty, as defined by the World Bank. And that has indeed been [declining steeply](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.DDAY) over the past four decades.

Hickel claims that there are a number of problems with Gates' graph. "First of all, real data on poverty has only been collected since 1981," he argues. "Anything before that is extremely sketchy, and to go back as far as 1820 is meaningless." As we'll see, that's also wrong, but for now let's follow Hickel's lead and look at that more recent period.

So what do the "real data" on poverty tell us? Starting with that $1.90-per-day measurement, the level of extreme poverty fell from 42.2 percent of the world's population in 1981 to [8.6 percent in 2018](https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2018/09/19/decline-of-global-extreme-poverty-continues-but-has-slowed-world-bank). In 1981, 1.9 billion people lived on less than $1.90 per day; in 2018, the number was around 660 million.

Don't like that metric? The World Bank has adopted two additional poverty threshold measures at [$3.20 and $5.50 per day per person](http://blogs.worldbank.org/developmenttalk/richer-array-international-poverty-lines). They too are falling:

But Hickel doesn't bother to tell his readers what the global income data say about those trends. Instead he insists on his own threshold of $7.40 per person per day. "We see that the number of people living under this line has increased dramatically since measurements began in 1981, reaching some 4.2 billion people today," he observes.

Charitably interpreted, Hickel has succumbed to [judgment creep](http://science.sciencemag.org/content/360/6396/1465). The Harvard psychologist Daniel Gilbert and his colleagues have argued, in a 2018 [study](http://science.sciencemag.org/content/360/6396/1465) published in Science, we are misled about the state of the world because we have a tendency to continually raise our threshold for success as we make progress. "Solving problems causes us to expand our definitions of them," they [explain](https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2018/06/180628151752.htm). "When problems become rare, we count more things as problems. Our studies suggest that when the world gets better, we become harsher critics of it, and this can cause us to mistakenly conclude that it hasn't actually gotten better at all. Progress, it seems, tends to mask itself."

In 1981, 42.2, 57.1, and 66.4 percent of the world's population fell below the $1.90, $3.20, and $5.50 thresholds respectively. By 2015, those ratios had dropped to 10.0, 26.3, and 46.0 percent. Even though the world population increased from 4.5 to 7.3 billion from 1981 to 2015, the absolute number of people living on less than $5.50 a day peaked at around 4 billion in 1999 and fell to 3.4 billion in 2015. If current rising income trends continue, the number of people living on less than $7.40 per day will soon start to drop too. At which point Hickel will again have to shift his goalposts.

And yes, the absolute number of people living under Hickel's threshold has increased. But that's just because the world's population has gone up. The percentage of people in that category has been falling.

Meanwhile, using slightly different data, researchers associated with the [World Data Lab and the Brookings Institution](https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2018/09/27/a-global-tipping-point-half-the-world-is-now-middle-class-or-wealthier/) reported in September 2018 that "just over 50 percent of the world's population, or some 3.8 billion people, live in households with enough discretionary expenditure to be considered 'middle class' or 'rich.' About the same number of people are living in households that are poor or vulnerable to poverty." These researchers broadly define the "middle class" to cover households spending $11 to $110 per day per person, in 2011 purchasing power parity. (Purchasing power parity is when the price of identical goods and services are equal in one country and another country when factoring in the exchange rate.)

World Data Lab

Hickel is also wrong when he claims that trying to calculate extreme poverty rates as far back as 1820 is "meaningless." He asserts that the folks at Our World in Data are inappropriately [citing a 2002 study](http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/files/BourguignonMorrisson2002.pdf) that was focused chiefly on inequality in the distribution of world GDP. But determining inequality ratios requires that you figure out the spread of incomes that people earned. In this case, the researchers used the World Bank's extreme poverty threshold, measured as living on less than $1 per day in 1985 dollars, and reported that it "[fell from 84 percent](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/declining-global-poverty-share-1820-2015) of the world population in 1820 to 24 percent in 1992." Measured as living on less than $2 per day in 1985 dollars, they calculated a 94 percent poverty rate in 1820.

"World economic growth, though strongly inegalitarian, contributed to a steady decline in the headcount measure of poverty throughout the period under analysis," the researchers report. "Over the 172 years considered here, the mean income of world inhabitants increased by a factor of 7.6. The mean income of the bottom 20 percent increased only by a factor of slightly more than 3, that of the bottom 60 percent by about 4, and that of the top decile by almost 10." In other words, as a global average, the rich got richer faster than the poorest folk did, but the circumstances of both improved significantly. The same dynamic is still at work today, and that's what really annoys Hickel.

Why did Hickel feel the need to deny that plain facts about these positive global trends? Largely because he wants to claim even if global poverty as measured by mere monetary income has been declining, that actually implicates pervasive Western oppression. What these data on improving incomes really "reveal is that the world went from a situation where most of humanity had no need of money at all to one where today most of humanity struggles to survive on extremely small amounts of money," he claims. "Prior to colonisation, most people lived in subsistence economies where they enjoyed access to abundant commons—land, water, forests, livestock and robust systems of sharing and reciprocity. They had little if any money, but then they didn't need it in order to live well—so it makes little sense to claim that they were poor."

Not to complicate matters too much, but most people encountered by colonizers lived in hierarchical, largely agricultural societies—empires, kingdoms, etc.—and not in the egalitarian commons of Hickel's imagination. But some groups, such as the aborigines in Australia and the Kung! in Africa, remained more or less pure hunter-gatherers. It's not a good idea to romanticize their lives: A 2013 study aggregating [mortality data for several groups of hunter-gatherers](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/256641936_Infant_and_child_death_in_the_human_environment_of_evolutionary_adaptation) reports an average infant mortality rate (defined as death before the child's first birthday) of 27 percent and a child mortality rate (death before the 15th birthday) of 49 percent. The Our World in Data chart cited by Gates notes that the [global child mortality rate](https://ourworldindata.org/child-mortality) (here defined as death before age 5) declined from 43 percent in 1800 to 4.3 percent now. Similarly, a [2007 review article](http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.737.7899&rep=rep1&type=pdf) of life trajectories of various subsistence society groups found that "on average 57 percent, 64 percent, and 67 percent of children born survive to age 15 years among hunter-gatherers, forager-horticulturalists, and acculturated hunter-gatherers." (The researchers define acculturated hunter-gatherers as groups that have either recently started horticulture and/or have been exposed to medicines, markets, and other modern amenities.)

Hickel does have a grain of a point here: If a society meets a substantial share of people's needs outside the monetary economy, income statistics aren't the best way to measure their well-being. But you can still compare life expectancy in those communities to life expectancy elsewhere. The 2007 review article finds that "among traditional hunter-gatherers, the average life expectancy at birth varies from 21 to 37 years, the proportion surviving to age 45 varies between 26 percent and 43 percent, and life expectancy at age 45 varies from 14 to 24 years." That's essentially the same range as global life expectancy in 1800. In 2016, global average life expectancy [exceeded 72 years](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN). The proportion of hunter-gatherers surviving to age 45 is considerably lower than 55 percent of Englishmen back in 1851. The range of 14 to 24 years of additional life expectancy for hunter-gatherers at age 45 is basically [the same as for Europeans at age 65](https://data.oecd.org/healthstat/life-expectancy-at-65.htm) today.

Nor is life expectency the only statistic at our disposal. That 2007 paper reports that violence (homicide and warfare) accounted for [18.8 percent of the deaths](http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.737.7899&rep=rep1&type=pdf) among the subsistence groups under review. For comparison's sake, interpersonal and collective violence in 2016 [claimed the lives of 560,000 people](http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/U-Reports/SAS-Report-GVD2017.pdf) around the world. Given a world population of 7.7 billion, that's a death by violence rate about 0.007 percent.

Why has Hickel engaged in such statistical subterfuges and Edenic anthropological handwaving? Because he despises "free market capitalism" and wants to issue "a ringing indictment of our global economic system, which is failing the vast majority of humanity." Except, as we've seen, it is not. During the past two centuries, that system has lifted billions out of humanity's natural state of abject poverty, ignorance, and violence, and that process of economic uplift has dramatically accelerated in the past four decades. If the institutions that undergird that growth can be sustained, average incomes will continue to their rapid rise, enabling those around the globe who are still mired in poverty to enjoy ever greater prosperity.

Bottom line: Bill Gates is right that poverty is decreasing, and Hickel couldn't be more wrong.

### 1NR---AT: Method

#### *Even if* revolutionary movements are successful, the chaos of the transition causes mass violence and repression that repeats the pitfalls of capitalism.

Wright 17, \*Erik Olin Wright, Professor of Sociology at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, USA. Director of A. E. Havens Center for Social Justice, University of Wisconsin-Madison, (2017, “How to be an Anti-capitalist for the 21st Century”, https://www.redalyc.org/journal/124/12452111002/html/)

Smashing This is the classic strategic logic of revolutionaries. The rationale goes something like this: The system is rotten. All efforts to make life tolerable within capitalism will eventually fail. From time to time small reforms that improve the lives of people may be possible when popular forces are strong, but such improvements will always be fragile, vulnerable to attack and reversible. Ultimately it is an illusion that capitalism can be rendered a benign social order in which ordinary people can live flourishing, meaningful lives. At its core, capitalism is unreformable. The only hope is to destroy it, sweep away the rubble and then build an alternative. As the closing words of the early twentieth century song Solidarity Forever proclaim, “We can bring to birth a new world from the ashes of the old.” The full realization of the emancipatory alternative may be gradual, but the necessary condition for such a gradual transition is a ruptural break in the existing system of power. But how to do this? How is it possible for anti-capitalist forces to amass sufficient power to destroy capitalism and replace it with a better alternative? This is indeed a daunting task, for the power of dominant classes that makes reform an illusion also blocks the revolutionary goal of a rupture in the system. Anti-capitalist revolutionary theory, informed by the writings of Marx and extended by Lenin, Gramsci and others, offered an attractive argument about how this could take place: While it is true that much of the time capitalism seems unassailable, it is also a deeply contradictory system, prone to disruptions and crises. Sometimes those crises reach an intensity which makes the system as a whole fragile, vulnerable to challenge. In the strongest versions of the theory, there are even underlying tendencies in the “laws of motion” of capitalism for the intensity of such system-weakening crises to increase over time, so that in the long-term capitalism becomes unsustainable; it destroys its own conditions of existence. But even if there is no systematic tendency for crises to become ever-worse, what can be predicted is that periodically there will be intense capitalist economic crises in which the system becomes vulnerable and ruptures become possible. The problem for a revolutionary party, therefore, is to be in a position to take advantage of the opportunity created by such system-level crises to lead a mass mobilization to seize state power, either through elections or through an insurrectionary overthrow of the existing regime. Once in control of the state, the first task is to rapidly refashion the state itself to make it a suitable weapon of ruptural transformation, and then use that power to repress the opposition of the dominant classes and their allies, dismantle the pivotal power structures of capitalism, and build the necessary institutions for the long-term development of an alternative economic system. In the 20th century, various versions of this general line of reasoning animated the imagination of revolutionaries around the world. Revolutionary Marxism infused struggles with hope and optimism, for it not only provided a potent indictment of the world as it existed, but also provided a plausible scenario for how an emancipatory alternative could be realized. This gave people courage, sustaining the belief that they were on the side of history and that the enormous commitment and sacrifices they were called on to make in their struggles against capitalism had real prospects of eventually succeeding. And sometimes, if rarely, such struggles did culminate in the revolutionary seizure of state power. The results of such revolutionary seizures of power, however, were never the creation of a democratic, egalitarian, emancipatory alternative to capitalism. While revolutions in the name of socialism and communism did demonstrate that it was possible “to build a new world from the ashes of the old,” and in certain specific ways they may have improved the material conditions of life of most people for a period of time, the evidence of the heroic attempts at rupture in the 20th century is that they do not produce the kind of new world envisioned in revolutionary ideology. It is one thing to burn down old institutions and social structures; it is quite another to build emancipatory new institutions from the ashes. Why the revolutions of the 20th century never resulted in robust, sustainable human emancipation is, of course, a hotly debated matter. Some people argue that this was just because of the historically specific, unfavorable circumstances of the attempts at system-wide ruptures. Revolutions occurred in economically backward societies, surrounded by powerful enemies. Some argue it was because of strategic errors of the leadership of those revolutions. Others indict the motives of leadership: the leaders that triumphed in the course of these revolutions were motivated by desires for status and power rather than the empowerment and wellbeing of the masses. And still others argue that failure is intrinsic to any attempt at radical rupture in a social system. There are too many moving parts, too much complexity and too many unintended consequences. As a result, attempts at system-rupture will inevitably tend to unravel into such chaos that revolutionary elites, regardless of their motives, will be compelled to resort to pervasive violence and repression to sustain social order. Such violence, in turn, destroys the possibility for a genuinely democratic, participatory process of building a new society.

#### Armed opposition to the state fails.

**DeBoer 16**, Ph.D. from Purdue University, (Fredrik Deboer, March 15th, 2016, “c’mon, guys,” http://fredrikdeboer.com/2016/03/15/cmon-guys/)

I could be wrong about the short-term dangers, and the stakes are incredibly high. But in the end we’re left with the same old question: what tactics will actually work to secure a better world?

In a sharp, sober piece about the meaning of left-wing political violence in the 1970s, Tim Barker writes “If you can’t acknowledge radical violence, radicals are reduced to mere victims of repression, rather than political actors who made definite tactical choices under given political circumstances.” The problem, as Barker goes on to imply, is those tactical choices: in today’s America they will essentially never break on the side of armed opposition against the state. The government knows everything about you, I’m sorry to say, your movements and your associations and the books you read and the things you buy and what you’re saying to the people you communicate with. That’s simply on the level of information before we even get to the state’s incredible capacity to inflict violence.

Look, the world has changed. The relative military capacity of regular people compared to establishment governments has changed, especially in fully developed, technology-enabled countries like the United States. The Czar had his armies, yes, but the Czar’s armies depended on manpower above and beyond everything else. The fighting was still mostly different groups of people with rifles shooting at each other. If tomorrow you could rally as many people as the Bolsheviks had at their revolutionary peak, you’re still left in a world of F-15s, drones, and cluster bombs. And that’s to say nothing of the fact that establishment governments in the developed world can rely on the numbing agents of capitalist luxuries and the American dream to damper revolutionary enthusiasm even among the many millions who have been marginalized and impoverished. This just isn’t 1950s Cuba, guys. It’s just not. In a very real way, modern technology effectively lowers the odds of armed political revolution in a country like the United States to zero, and so much the worse for us.

This isn’t fatalism. It doesn’t mean there’s no hope. It means that there is little alternative to organization, to changing minds through committed political action and using the available nonviolent means to create change: a concert of grassroots organizing, labor tactics, and partisan politics. Those things aren’t exactly likely to work, either, but they’re a hell of a lot more plausible than us dweebs taking the Pentagon. Bernie Sanders isn’t really a socialist, but he’s a social democrat that moves the conversation to the left, and if people are dedicated and committed to organizing, the local, state, and national candidates he inspires will move it further to the left still. You got any better suggestions?

#### Myopic focus on capitalism’s pitfalls is dangerous---singular instances of failure can’t overcome the vast material, empirical benefits capitalism has over any alternative.

Norberg 03, MA in History of Ideas with focus on economics and philosophy (Jonah, “In Defense of Global Capitalism,” pg. 290)

Capitalism is not a perfect system, and it is not good for everyone all the time. Critics of globalization are good at pointing out individual harms—a factory that has closed down, a wage that has been reduced. Such things do happen, but by concentrating solely on individual instances, one may miss the larger reality of how a political or economic system generally works and what fantastic values it confers on the great majority compared with other alternatives. Problems are found in every political and economic system, but rejecting all systems is not an option. Hunting down negative examples of what can happen in a market economy is easy enough. By that method water or fire can be proved to be bad things, because some people drown and some get burned to death, but this isn’t the full picture.

A myopic focus on capitalism’s imperfections ignores the freedom and independence that it confers on people who have never experienced anything but oppression. It also disregards the calm and steady progress that is the basic rule of a society with a market economy. There is nothing wrong with identifying problems and mishaps in a predominantly successful system if one does so with the constructive intent of rectifying or alleviating them. But someone who condemns the system as such is obligated to answer this question: What political and economic system could manage things better? Never before in human history has prosperity grown so rapidly and poverty declined so heavily. Is there any evidence, either in history or in the world around us, to suggest that another system could do as well?

#### Capitalism is inevitable.

Wiedmann et al. 20, \*Thomas Wiedmann, PhD, Associate Professor of Sustainability Research at the University of New South Wales. \*Manfred Lenzen. PhD, Professor of Sustainability Research at Integrated Sustainability Analysis (ISA) in the School of Physics at the University of Sydney. \*Lorenz T. Keyßer, Institute for Environmental Decisions, Department of Environmental Systems Science, ETH Zürich. \*Julia K. Steinberger, PhD, Professor of Ecological Economics at the University of Lausanne. (6-19-2020, "Scientists’ warning on affluence", *Nature Communications*, https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-020-16941-y?fbclid=IwAR0AG6Lz\_CcR2XY0uxVvKNmjnlWP0YLXl6iBcUfl8gcZmTjR7-ZVb3W3oes)

Super-affluent consumers and growth imperatives

Growth imperatives are active at multiple levels, making the pursuit of economic growth (net investment, i.e. investment above depreciation) a necessity for different actors and leading to social and economic instability in the absence of it7,52,60. Following a Marxian perspective as put forward by Pirgmaier and Steinberger61, growth imperatives can be attributed to capitalism as the currently dominant socio-economic system in affluent countries7,51,62, although this is debated by other scholars52. To structure this topic, we will discuss different affected actors separately, namely corporations, states and individuals, following Richters and Siemoneit60. Most importantly, we address the role of the super-affluent consumers within a society, which overlap with powerful fractions of the capitalist class. From a Marxian perspective, this social class is structurally defined by its position in the capitalist production process, as financially tied with the function of capital63. In capitalism, workers are separated from the means of production, implying that they must compete in labour markets to sell their labour power to capitalists in order to earn a living.

Even though some small- and medium-sized businesses manage to refrain from pursuing growth, e.g. due to a low competition intensity in niche markets, or lack of financial debt imperatives, this cannot be said for most firms64. In capitalism, firms need to compete in the market, leading to a necessity to reinvest profits into more efficient production processes to minimise costs (e.g. through replacing human labour power with machines and positive returns to scale), innovation of new products and/or advertising to convince consumers to buy more7,61,62. As a result, the average energy intensity of labour is now twice as high as in 195060. As long as a firm has a competitive advantage, there is a strong incentive to sell as much as possible. Financial markets are crucial to enable this constant expansion by providing (interest-bearing) capital and channelling it where it is most profitable58,61,63. If a firm fails to stay competitive, it either goes bankrupt or is taken over by a more successful business. Under normal economic conditions, this capitalist competition is expected to lead to aggregate growth dynamics7,62,63,65.

However, two factors exist that further strengthen this growth dynamic60. Firstly, if labour productivity continuously rises, then aggregate economic growth becomes necessary to keep employment constant, otherwise technological unemployment results. This creates one of the imperatives for capitalist states to foster aggregate growth, since with worsening economic conditions and high unemployment, tax revenues shrink, e.g. from labour and value-added taxes, while social security expenditures rise60,62. Adding to this, states compete with other states geopolitically and in providing favourable conditions for capital, while capitalists have the resources to influence political decisions in their favour. If economic conditions are expected to deteriorate, e.g. due to unplanned recession or progressive political change, firms can threaten capital flight, financial markets react and investor as well as consumer confidence shrink51,58,60. Secondly, consumers usually increase their consumption in tune with increasing production60. This process can be at least in part explained by substantial advertising efforts by firms47,52,66. However, further mechanisms are at play as explained further below.

Following this analysis, it is not surprising that the growth paradigm is hegemonic, i.e. the perception that economic growth solves all kinds of societal problems, that it equals progress, power and welfare and that it can be made practically endless through some form of supposedly green or sustainable growth59. Taken together, the described dynamics create multiple dependencies of workers, firms and states on a well-functioning capital accumulation and thus wield more material, institutional and discursive power (e.g. for political lobbying) to capitalists who are usually the most affluent consumers61,67. Even if different fractions of the capitalist class have manifold and competing interests which need to be constantly renegotiated, there is a common interest in maintaining the capitalist system and favourable conditions for capital accumulation, e.g. through aggregate growth and high consumption51,62. How this political corruption by the super-affluent plays out in practice is well documented, e.g. for the meat industry in Denmark6.

#### Intercommunalism is magnitudes times worse for the environment.

Regan 19, vice president of research at the[PROPERTY AND ENVIRONMENT RESEARCH CENTER](https://www.perc.org/) (PERC) in Bozeman, Mont, (Shawn, May 16th, 2019, “Socialism Is Bad for the Environment”, https://www.nationalreview.com/magazine/2019/06/03/socialism-is-bad-for-the-environment/)

As the Soviet Union began to collapse, the socialist economist Robert Heilbroner admitted that central planning had failed economically but said we needed “to rethink the meaning of socialism.” Now it was the thing that had to emerge if humanity was to cope with “the one transcendent challenge that faces it within a thinkable timespan.” Heilbroner considered this one thing to be “the ecological burden that economic growth is placing on the environment.” Markets may be better at allocating resources, Heilbroner thought, but only socialism could avoid ecological disaster.

Not long after, however, it became clear that the socialist economies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union were not just economic failures; they were also environmental catastrophes. Economist Jeffrey Sachs noted at the time that the socialist nations had “some of the worst environmental problems in the entire globe.” Air and water pollution abounded. By one estimate, in the late 1980s, particulate air pollution was 13 times higher per unit of GDP in Central and Eastern Europe than in Western Europe. Levels of gaseous air pollution were twice as high as this. Wastewater pollution was three times higher.

And people’s health was suffering as a result. Respiratory illnesses from pollution were rampant. In East Germany,  60 percent of the population suffered from respiratory ailments. In Leningrad (now St. Petersburg), nearly half of all children had intestinal disorders caused by contaminated water. Children in Poland were found to have five times more lead in their blood than children in Western Europe. Conditions were so bad that, as Heilbroner acknowledged, the Soviet Union became the first industrialized country in history to experience a prolonged peacetime decline in average life expectancy.

As the Iron Curtain lifted, socialism’s dirty environmental secret was exposed: Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union were the most polluted and degraded places on earth. “When historians finally conduct an autopsy of the Soviet Union and Soviet Communism,” economist Murray Feshbach and journalist Alfred Friendly Jr. wrote in 1992, “they may reach the verdict of death by ecocide.”

Consider the destruction of the Aral Sea between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, which has been called “one of the planet’s worst environmental disasters.” Once the world’s fourth-largest inland body of water, it shrank to less than half its original size because of Soviet economic policies. Fixated on making the USSR self-sufficient in cotton production, central planners mandated industrial agriculture throughout the arid region. Massive water diversions for irrigation reduced the sea’s inflows to a trickle, causing the biggest manmade loss of water in history. Fishing villages became dry and landlocked. Some, such as the former port city of Muynak, now lie more than 75 miles from the sea.

The desiccation of the Aral Sea also caused severe health problems throughout the region. As the waters receded, the sea’s salty floor was exposed, along with pesticides that had accumulated from agricultural operations. All this was then carried by strong winds to nearby communities. Respiratory problems, throat cancer, and other illnesses became more common as the pollutants were deposited in the lungs of millions. The human and environmental consequences are still being felt. Today, infant-mortality rates in the Aral Sea region remain significantly higher than the national average in Uzbekistan, and children there experience similarly high rates of anemia, diarrheal diseases, and other illnesses caused by exposure to toxic contaminants.

How can this be? “Environmental deterioration was not supposed to occur under socialism,” Cuban-American researchers Sergio Díaz-Briquets and Jorge Pérez-López wrote in a detailed study of Cuba’s environmental legacy. “According to conventional Marxist-Leninist dogma, environmental deterioration was precipitated by the logic of capitalism and its relentless pursuit of profits.” Socialism, on the other hand, would avoid capitalism’s excesses. “Guided by ‘scientific’ principles, socialism’s goal was a classless and bountiful society,” they explained, “populated by men and women living in harmony with each other and the environment.”

But this was clearly not the case in the Soviet empire. Nor was it in Cuba, whose environmental record after decades of socialist control was described by Díaz-Briquets and Pérez-López as “far different from the utopian view.” The West, meanwhile, had not only the consumer goods that socialist societies lacked but also a cleaner environment.

One explanation for the disparity is that central planners, unlike markets, grossly misallocate resources, as a matter of routine. Energy prices, for example, were highly subsidized in the socialist economies of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. As a result, industrial production was far more energy-intensive throughout the socialist world than in Western European economies — five to ten times higher, according to one estimate — leading to more pollution. A 1992 World Bank study found that more than half of the air pollution in the former Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe could be attributed to subsidized energy pricing during this period.

A related problem was the fixation of socialist planners on heavy industry at the expense of the environment. “The singular dominant fact of the Soviet economic strategy,” Jeffrey Sachs has noted, “was the subordination of all human and economic goals to the development of heavy industry.” Industrial pollution from factories in Eastern Europe was so bad that Time described it as the region “where the sky stays dark.” Acid rain in Krakow severely damaged the city’s historic structures and buildings, some of which required renovations, and even corroded the faces of many centuries-old statues.

Of course, industry behind the Iron Curtain was anything but efficient, and central planning caused excessive use of natural resources. A 1991 study by Mikhail Bernstam found that market economies used about one-third as much energy and steel per unit of GDP as did socialist countries. Likewise, Polish economist Tomasz Zylicz found that the non-market economies of Central and Eastern Europe required two to three times more inputs to produce a given output than did Western European economies. (The former Soviet world, as well as China, also emitted several times more carbon  per unit of GDP than the United States did — a trend that continues today.) Simply put, market economies make more with less and are therefore better for the environment.

Socialist planners, on the other hand, lack the knowledge necessary to rationally coordinate economic activity. Moreover, bureaucratic constraints make accurate price-setting impossible. In their 1989 book The Turning Point, Soviet economists Nikolai Shmelev and Vladimir Popov offered an illustrative example. To bolster the production of gloves, the Soviet government more than doubled the price it paid for moleskin. Warehouses soon filled with mole pelts, but glovemakers were unable to use them all, so many rotted. As the economists explained:

The Ministry of Light Industry has already requested Goskomtsen [the State Committee on Prices] twice to lower the purchasing prices, but “the question has not been decided” yet. And this is not surprising. Its members are too busy to decide. They have no time: besides setting prices on these pelts, they have to keep track of another 24 million prices. And how can they possibly know how much to lower the price today, so they won’t have to raise it tomorrow?

Therein lies a crucial flaw in socialist economic logic, and one that has real environmental consequences: Whereas a capitalist firm has ample incentive to act on such information to economize on the use of natural resources, socialist planners have no such motivation — Soviet bureaucracies, Shmelev and Popov noted, were “able only to correct the most obvious price disproportions several years after” they appeared — nor do they have the knowledge needed to accurately set millions of prices at once. And if there are no market prices to convey accurate information about the value of scarce natural resources, there is little chance of conserving them.

Finally, there is the issue of property rights. In a socialist society without them, it is impossible to hold individuals or governments accountable for environmental damages: Planners can increase industrial output without compensating those who bear its costs in the form of pollution. In a capitalist society, property rights offer protection against environmental harms and give resource owners incentives to conserve.

Socialism’s environmental record is just as bad elsewhere. As Díaz-Briquets and Pérez-López document, in Cuba, socialists’ quest to maximize production at all costs has caused extensive air, soil, and water pollution. And in Venezuela, socialist policies have contaminated the nation’s drinking-water supplies, fueled rampant deforestation and unrestrained mining activity, and caused frequent oil spills attributed to neglect and mismanagement by the state-owned energy company.

As socialist ideas capture the American imagination — and are often portrayed, as with the Green New Deal, as necessary to avoid environmental catastrophe — it’s important to remember socialism’s dismal environmental legacy. Capitalism may be a dirty word these days, but when it comes to producing the prosperity and creativity necessary to sustain a clean environment, it’s still the best system we’ve got.

#### Intercommunalism heightens income inequality.

Henderson et al. 05, \*David R. Henderson is an associate professor of economics at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, and research fellow with the Hoover Institution, Stanford University; Robert M. McNab is an assistant professor of economics in the Defense Resources Management Institute at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California; and Tamás Rózsás is leading councilor in the Ministry of Economy and Transport, Department of Information Technologies and Statistics, Budapest, Hungary; (2005, “The Hidden Inequality in Socialism”, https://www.independent.org/pdf/tir/tir\_09\_3\_5\_henderson.pdf)

Conclusion In the past few years, researchers on transition economies have found that income inequality increased in spite of the liberalization of political and economic life in the former socialist countries of eastern Europe and central Asia. Because this observed increase in inequality contradicted previous findings in other regions (Gradstein and Milanovic 2000) and because many authors warned about poor data quality (Milanovic 1998; Rosser, Rosser, and Ahmed 2000), overlooked factors (Kattuman and Redmond 2001), and the effect of special circumstances (Ferreira 1999), the observed increase was suspect and required further analysis. Other research into various relevant factors reveals the weakness of the argument that the economic and political liberalization of the centrally planned economies caused greater income inequality (Henderson, McNab, and Rózsás 2004). This research also shows that there is a firmer basis for an explanation founded on the existence of a large uniform bias in the pretransition data toward smaller measured inequality. Unfortunately, the reconstruction of pretransition data on income inequality with greater accuracy and reliability is not possible. Therefore, in this article we have taken a different approach toward understanding the hidden inequality in socialism. We have argued that statistical data from the socialist era do not provide a basis for valid comparisons of socialist-era inequality and transition-period inequality of incomes. Economic indices were meaningless in a centrally planned economy; their purpose was to justify the regime’s existence, not to reveal its actual character. As a result, the socialist regimes’ statistical methods were unreliable and inaccurate, and they concealed huge inequalities. In addition, the socialist economy and society had built-in mechanisms to hide huge income transfers from even the most accurate survey methods. Consequently, in the transition period, the ultimate source of the inequalities was neither the economic or political liberalization nor the transformation from a centrally planned economy to market-oriented economy nor any other aspect of the transition process. Rather, the inequality reflected the uncontrolled political power in the socialist era. This power provided the ruling class the means to concentrate the economy’s benefits in its own hands through legalized pillage of private property, the promotion of corruption, and the system of privileged access to consumer goods. In summary, the inequalities of real disposable income were so great in these societies and survey methods so unreliable that even if accurate measures of inequality for the socialist era cannot be reconstructed, a real increase of income inequality during the transition seems unlikely to have occurred. In addition, programs that actually increased income inequality by helping some of the higher-income people looked to the outside world like programs that helped the poorest. Most of these countries were much poorer than the official communist propaganda reported. Therefore, a program that subsidized, say, petty party functionaries and miners, who were poor by Western standards, actually transferred wealth from the poorest to the second-highest tier in communist society. Besides serving as a source of nostalgia for the communist past, income inequality in transition countries is important as an indicator of the “state of affairs” in these countries. In fact, the causes of income inequality are more important than the degree of income inequality itself. In a socialist economy, income inequality hinges for the most part on differences in political power, political connections, and loyalty to the government. To better one’s economic condition in a socialist economy, therefore, one must become politically connected or, at least, must display loyalty to the government. Also, because people have little incentive to produce valuable goods in a socialist economy, most people claw for improved position in a zero-sum game in which one person’s gain is another’s loss. In a market economy, by contrast, income inequality reflects differences in productive ability for the most part. The way to better oneself economically in a market economy, therefore, is to become more productive—that is, to contribute more to the wealth of one’s fellow human beings in return for pecuniary rewards. Markets are positive-sum games. Bill Gates and Michael Dell are extraordinarily wealthy not because of their political connections (as Gates learned the hard way in the late 1990s, when the U.S. government sued his company), but because they have produced goods that consumers value. Inequalities in a market economy, therefore, serve a useful function, giving people incentives to work harder, study more, and take sensible risks, thereby contributing to other people’s well-being. Further research should focus on the causes of inequality instead of its degree, with special attention on corruption and income redistribution through government transfers